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"THE INVISIBLE LINES BETWEEN US": BORDER-MAKING IN ANGLO-
AMERICA, 1750-1800 
by 
Cameron B Strang 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2008 
This thesis explores how the boundary-making practices of white officials came 
to be the dominant way of dividing and claiming the American landscape. It argues that, 
in the late colonial era, neither Indians nor officials could actualize their desired 
boundaries. Indians' map-based boundaries were annulled by white officials while 
officials' land surveys were subject to onsite termination and manipulation by Indian 
groups. White frontier settlers, however, developed powerful ways to establish their land 
claims—namely informal delineations backed by actual settlement—that could not be 
prevented by officials or Indians. In the final years of the colonial era and the first 
decades of the independence period, officials co-opted settlers' extra-legal methods of 
claiming land and applied them on the large scale. This fusion of settler boundary-
making practices with those of officials allowed the U.S. government to impose its own 
geographic ideals on America and its various cultural groups. 
v 
INTRODUCTION 
"This is America! You can't just come in here and steal our land!" 
-It's Always Sunny in Philadelphia, Season II. 
In the modern United States, land is divided in standard ways. Dark lines 
demarcate national borders on maps and, at ground level, border-crossing stations or 
guarded fences are clear signs on the landscape that we have reached the limits of our 
own country. Buildings, modified landscapes, fences, and clearings are recognized as 
signifiers of owned space. The fact that U.S. citizens acknowledge a coherent system of 
delimiting American territory allows land disputes to be decided by a uniform set of laws. 
If, however, different groups within the country based their claims to land ownership on 
entirely different notions of space, land disputes would be chaotic.1 Not only would each 
group be unable or unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of other groups' boundaries, but 
claims would overlap without any mutually accepted way of resolving who actually has 
rights to that space. More than likely, conflict would ensue, and the most powerful group 
would either absorb aberrant systems into its own or force their standards onto weaker 
groups. 
1
 There is only one legally accepted spatial system in the U.S. on which claims are based, yet cultural (and 
even personal) concepts of space and place, and what landscapes mean to groups and individuals, are still 
highly varied throughout the country. As anthropologist Keith H. Basso points out, "place-making" 
involves far more than the border-making methods that bound an area. Landscapes are given meaning 
through "multiple acts of remembering and imagining" and can serve as sites where personal and social 
identities can be defined and constructed. Keith H. Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and 
Language Among the Western Apache (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 6-7. 
1 
This process of homogenizing spatial systems through accommodation and 
compulsion had been occurring in eastern British America since the arrival of European 
settlers and, by the mid eighteenth century, the three main cultural groups—Indians, 
white officials, and white settlers—shared much common ground (both geographically 
and conceptually). Yet the British victory in the Seven Years War and the subsequent 
white rush into the backcountry made questions of land rights more pertinent than ever, 
and Indians, officials, and settlers all made claims to this space with their own culturally-
distinct systems. 
From about 1750 to 1770, Indians and white officials were able to keep each 
other's systems for claiming space (and thus right to own it) in check because both of 
their systems were based on mutually recognized formal geographic conventions and 
technologies. Thus Indians, who recognized that they were increasingly outnumbered, 
hoped to have their rights recognized through European-style maps. These boundaries, 
however, were only substantive if white officials agreed to sanction and respect them. 
Officials based their own spatial system on onsite land surveys, but Indians could alter or 
forestall these boundaries by coercing surveyors in the West. Chapters One and Two 
show how both of these groups' reliance on formal border-making systems prevented 
either of them from achieving their desired boundaries. 
Chapter Three demonstrates how white settlers, a cultural group that utilized 
informal and illegal ways of claiming space, were actually the most successful at taking 
up the West for themselves. The settler land ethic required only very basic technology to 
create physical marks of possession that were legitimized by the act of settlement itself. 
2 
Although neither Indians nor white officials considered their claims to be valid, they 
could not prevent the masses of squatters from overrunning the frontiers. 
In the last years of the colonial period and the early decades of the Republic, 
white officials successfully integrated settlers and the most efficient aspects of their land 
ethic into official policy. This new all-white racial alliance permitted officials to use 
extralegal violence to impose its own geographic system onto reluctant Indians. By the 
end of the eighteenth century, Indians' border-making powers were no longer recognized 
and official borders could no longer be manipulated. The stage was set for the 
transformation of the entire American landscape by and for white Americans. 
Scholars have written extensively on both border-making and the eighteenth 
century Anglo-American frontier, but they have overlooked how different border-making 
systems collided in this setting and why the geography of white officials ultimately 
triumphed to become the only recognized way of conceptualizing land. The Anglo-
American frontier is a particularly interesting setting to study boundary-making in its 
cultural context because it was perhaps the only area in the early modern Atlantic World 
that was divided by racism, at least in the modern sense of the word.2 The violence and 
new ideologies of the 1750s and 1760s made Indians and whites see each other as 
inherently different enemies and create boundaries of separation. The borders made by 
2
 There are several variations in scholarship accounting for this shift. Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The 
History of an Idea in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); originally published in 1963, 
Gosset skipped the eighteenth century as a key era in the growth of modern concepts of race, claiming that 
Indians were considered to be "damned from birth by God" in the seventeenth century and "damned by 
biology" in the nineteenth, ignoring the impact of the 1700s. George M. Frederickson, Racism: A Short 
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Frederickson found the roots of nineteenth century 
racism in the Renaissance, but racial typologies began to reach their modern form throughout the 
eighteenth century. Nicholas Hudson, "From 'Nation' to 'Race': The Origin of Racial Classification in 
Eighteenth Century Thought," in Eighteenth-Century Studies, 29.3 (1996), 247-269; Hudson argued that 
Indians were perceived as several disparate "nations" until the late eighteenth century, when they were 
conflated into one race. 
3 
both races only further aggravated the hate and the two peoples soon considered living 
together to be impossible. 
This thesis incorporates elements of several fields of history, including the history 
of geographic science and technology, the historiography on borderlands and frontiers, 
the New Indian History, and more general works on the Anglo-American backcountry. 
Recent writings on border-making sciences have focused almost exclusively on maps, 
especially their function as Foucaultian "technologies of power." The historian of 
cartography J.B. Harley was the most explicit exponent of examining maps as a form of 
imperial discourse, claiming that in "imperial contexts, maps regularly supported the 
direct execution of territorial power." I am not arguing against his theory that maps, like 
other discourses, are inherently biased constructions worthy of postmodern exegesis, but 
I found that maps themselves did little to actualize real possession of—much less power 
over—the land. Onsite delineations, either through surveys or less formal squatter's 
rights, were more important to substantiating whites' claims of possession. 
Considering the historiographical emphasis on cartography as a "classical form of 
power-knowledge,"4 it is surprising that historians of science who have studied surveying 
in colonial settings have generally done so without any reference to its broader cultural 
implications.5 Instead of considering how people at ground level employed and 
3
 J.B. Harley, The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), 58. Harley claims that "in the 'wilderness' of former Indian lands in North 
America, boundary lines on the map were a medium of appropriation which those unlearned in geometrical 
surveys methods found impossible to change," (ibid., 62). I argue against this approach. 
4
 Harley, 170. See also the work of Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, Christian Jacob, Jerry Broton, Margarita 
Bowen, and Matthew H. Edney. 
See: J.H. Andrews, Plantation Acres: An Historical Survey of the Irish Land Surveyor and His Maps, 
(Ulster Historical foundation, 1985); W.A. Taylor, Crown Lands: A History of Survey Systems (Victoria, 
B.C.: Surveyor General Branch, Ministry of Crown Lands, 1990); Katherine Gordon, Made to Measure: A 
4 
responded to this visible form of delineation, historians of surveying have narrowly 
studied surveyors, their techniques, and their instruments or have conflated surveying 
with its Cartesian byproduct, mapping. 
Conversely, with the exception of a few works on cartography,7 histories written 
Q 
about the late colonial backcountry have almost totally ignored border-makmg sciences. 
There are excellent studies on the role of science and technology in the early contact 
period, especially on how differing notions about nature, technology, and the body 
engendered concepts of racial difference that legitimated European conquest.9 Works on 
History of Land Surveying in British Columbia (Winlaw, B.C.: Sono Nis Press, 2006); Riley M. Moffat and 
Gary L. Fitzpatrick, Surveying the Mahele: Mapping the Hawaiian Land Revolution (Honolulu: Editions 
Limited, 1995); Sarah S. Hughes, Surveyors and Statesmen: Land Measuring in Colonial Virginia 
(Richmond: The Virginia Surveyors Association, 1979); Joseph W. Ernst, With Compass and Chain: 
Federal Land Surveyors in the Old Northwest (Ph. D. diss., Colombia University, 1958). 
One exception to this is Giselle Byrnes, Boundary Markers: Land Surveying and the Colonization of New 
Zealand (Wellington, NZ: Bridget Williams Books, 2001). Byrnes takes a post-modern approach to 
surveying by examining the role of language and what it meant to signify possession on the land itself. She 
found that the Maori "quickly adapted to the new system of land delineation," and learned how to both 
benefit from and resist surveys (96). 
See: Silvio A. Bedini, With Compass and Chain: Early American Surveyors and their Instruments 
(Frederick, MD: Professional Surveyors Publishing Co., Inc, 2001); Roy Minnick, ed., Plotters and 
Patterns of American Land Surveying (Rancho Cordova, CA: Landmark Enterprises, 1985); William D. 
Pattison, Beginnings of the American Rectangular Land Survey System, 1784-1800 (Chicago: Dept of 
Geography, University of Chicago, 1964); A.W. Richeson, English Land Measuring to 1800: Instruments 
and Practices (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966). 
7
 For example, Sara Stidstone Gronim, "Geography and Persuasion: Maps in British Colonial New York." 
In The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 58, No. 2. (April, 2001). 
8
 One important exception to this is Alan Taylor, who has shown the importance of land claiming systems, 
both formal and informal, to white land ownership in the Northeast. Alan Taylor, '"A Kind of Warr': The 
Contest for Land on the Northeastern Frontier, 1750-1820," in The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., 
Vol. 46, no. 1 (Jan., 1989); and The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the 
American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006). 
9
 See especially Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2000); and Joyce E. Chaplin, Subject Matter: Technology, the Body, and Science 
on the Anglo-American Frontier, 1500-1676 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). British 
colonists in the early seventeenth century believed the traits that made Indians distinct were determined by 
culture and climate, not naturally inherited. Indian skin was thus "tawny" because of exposure to the sun or 
the intentional dying of otherwise white infants. This did not necessarily make them inferior to Europeans, 
who often saw Indians as impressive physical specimens living in a state of naked innocence long since lost 
to the English. Yet, according to Joyce Chaplin, Europeans began to perceive Indian susceptibility to 
5 
the mid to late eighteenth century, however, eschew the lens of science in favor of 
culture, empire, and law.10 Thus instead of using contemporary science as a way of 
understanding racism in this period, historians have turned to violence, psychology, and 
language to explain this all important change in human relations. 
I argue that the ways Indians, officials, and white settlers made borders, and the 
conflicts that arose between different methods, had an important effect on culture, law, 
race, and violence in the Anglo-American backcountry. From 1750-1800, border-making 
east of the Mississippi changed from a process in which Indians and white officials 
counterbalanced each other's territorial ambitions to one almost totally dominated by 
whites. White officials monopolized the power to make legitimate boundaries only after 
disease as a mark of deep bodily differences that could not be accounted for by America's climate. In order 
to stave off illness, whites thought that Indians had to spend an inordinate amount of time building up 
bodily strength, leaving little time to develop a sophisticated civilization. The idea that Indian bodies and 
culture were naturally inferior to those of Englishmen generated imperial ideas that America could and 
should be populated by whites. 
10
 In cultural history, the most important works are those that have salvaged the cultures of "Indians" and 
"settlers" from being one-dimensional collectives without any real individual agency. The real complexity 
of the situation faced by various Indian groups is elucidated well by Daniel K. Richter, Facing East From 
Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); and 
Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). Patrick Griffin has done more than any other historian to show 
that frontier settlers were not just a Turnerian force of nature, but a unique cultural group that, though often 
brutally racist and violent, had distinct motivations from and goals for the world around them; Patrick 
Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2007). The study of empires in the West has also been revived by careful consideration of how Indians and 
the British tried to deal with the absence of France following the Seven Years War and the influx of settlers 
from the East. Eric Hinderaker, for one, found that the leaders of both Indian nations and the British 
colonies were unable to regulate affairs as they wished and ultimately failed to mediate how the West 
developed; Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997). The work of Robert A. Williams has shown how white officials 
conceived of law as something changeable in regard to Indian lands. By reiterating the tenets by which 
Indians could and did possess the West, land-hungry whites were able to legitimize their expansion with a 
variety of legal traditions; Robert A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The 
Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
1
' Jane T. Merritt argued that, by 1763, Indians and whites grew to hate each other because of feelings of 
betrayal and concurrent changes in language, such as the meaning of savagery; Jane T. Merritt, At The 
Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003). Similarly, Daniel K. Richter argued that the ideologies of white Indian-hating and 
Indian nativism (both of which developed in the early 1760s) made both races into an irreconcilable other; 
Daniel K. Richter, Facing East From Indian Country. 
6 
co-opting the informal land claiming methods of frontier settlers, a group whose practices 
officials had previously condemned as illegal and pernicious. By 1800, officials of the 
United States were creating formal boundaries through extralegal means, a powerful and 
flexible system of asserting land ownership that would underlie the expansion of the 
United States in the nineteenth century. 
7 
CHAPTER I 
"THIS VERY GROUND THAT IS UNDER ME": INDIAN MADE MAPS AND 
TERRITORIAL POSSESSION 
After one hundred and fifty years of contact, acculturation, and territorial 
dispossession, Indians had come to believe in the power of mapping as the border-making 
technique that afforded them the best chance of deciding their officially recognized 
limits. As Gregory Nobles notes, "the authority of cartography had an increasing appeal 
in the eighteenth century," a statement that holds true for whites and Indians alike.1 
Increasingly outnumbered, Indians turned to maps in an effort to create effective borders 
on paper because they could not enforce them on the ground. Since maps cannot and 
need not represent geopolitical realities, Indians hoped formal maps would make their 
territorial claims legitimate.2 
1
 Gregory Nobles, "Straight Lines and Stability: Mapping the Political Order of the Anglo-American 
Frontier," in The Journal of American History, Vol. 80, No. 1. (June 1993), 19. 
2
 On maps as socially embedded constructs that cannot represent reality and must be read critically, see J.B. 
Harley, The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001); Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Power of Projections: How Maps Reflect Global 
Politics and History (Westport: Praeger, 2006); and regarding the Anglo-American backcountry, Gregory 
Nobles, "Straight Lines and Stability." 
8 
Indians tried to use maps to impress their territorial claims upon the English, but 
these efforts failed because Indians lacked tangible ground level power to delineate and 
effectively defend their borders. Indians could and did emulate white officials' efforts to 
use maps to secure what they considered to be rightful claims; they could not, however, 
conduct land surveys, the system of territorial delineation that legitimized boundaries in 
the eyes of white officials. Indian mapping and official land surveying were both formal 
and accepted methods of making boundaries yet, by necessity, each relied on acceptance 
from the other group. The borders proposed by Indian maps needed approval from white 
officials to be recognized and, as will be seen in chapter two, official land surveys could 
be prevented or altered by Indians. 
In the 1750s and 1760s, Indians' map-based attempts to legitimize territorial 
possession took three identifiable forms: defending claims to inhabited lands, reclaiming 
lands that were illegally stolen, and—the rarest and most provocative form— 
rearticulating what it meant to own land and the rights by which it could be claimed. Of 
course, there is no single "Indian" story in this period or any other; each group (and 
individual) had disparate, overlapping, and often contradictory goals in their land 
dealings. Nevertheless, all North American Indians shared a common narrative of 
territorial dispossession by whites, one that they were quite conscious of in the eighteenth 
century. It is thus permissible, even advantageous, to examine the particular dealings of 
individual groups with various types of maps because such an examination evinces the 
similarities among failed territorial claims and, as in the case of Neolin's cosmographical 
map, highlights how maps could be used successfully. During the period being 
considered in this chapter (1756-1767), nations inhabiting areas north of Maryland were 
9 
more often involved in territorial disputes than those to the south, whose official 
complaints usually involved issues related to trade. In order to present as balanced a 
picture as possible of land dealings in these northern regions, I will focus in detail on 
three episodes involving Indian groups of varying size and power that employed very 
different cartographic styles. 
Throughout this chapter I will be using J.B. Harley's and David Woodward's 
inclusive definition of maps as "graphic representations that facilitate a spatial 
understanding of things, concepts, conditions, processes, or events in the human world." 
Thus I consider such items as wampum belts, spiritualistic diagrams, and modern 
Euclidean charts, all of which were used by Indians and whites in this period to claim 
land or express relationships within it. Indians also began using written descriptions of 
territorial boundaries, and though these were not actually graphic, they are formal 
geographic representations that mark a significant shift in how Indians claimed land. 
Such written maps, which draw almost exclusively on European conventions, are thus 
included as well. 
The goal of this chapter is to show how maps were used in mid eighteenth century 
Indian land claims. Thus I focus on Indian mapping techniques and the spatial 
conceptions that informed them circa 1750-70, not on the persistence of traditional 
cartography nor its replacement by English mapping. In this period, syncretism was a 
3
 Southern nations became increasingly involved with land disputes in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (the Creek/U.S. boundary discussed in the Coda is one example of this). For more on the 
importance of trade to intercultural diplomacy in the South, see J. Russell Snapp, John Stuart and the 
Struggle for Empire on the Southern Frontier (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996); and 
Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
4
 J.B. Harley and David Woodward, "Preface," in The History of Cartography, vol. 1. J.B. Harley and 
David Woodward, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), xvi. 
10 
sine qua non of Indian geographic technologies, especially cartography. Indians east of 
the Appalachians made Europeanized maps in an effort to fit their diminishing land 
claims within a European spatial system of acreage and linear borders, a desperate effort 
to define space for themselves in an increasingly European landscape. 
Whereas land surveys were the definitive aspect of English territorial claims in 
North America, Indians did not possess the tradition, technology, or cultural spatial 
conception necessary for linear surveying.5 Without these foundations, Indians could not 
develop a syncretic Anglo-Indian form of geometric land surveying, one that could have 
been used to formalize territorial claims at ground level in a way that Europeans would 
be obliged to recognize. In lieu of the knowledge or means to survey their boundaries, 
they chose instead to define and support their land claims with maps, a medium that 
could be made to fit European conventions relatively easily. They could make maps 
intelligible (and, hopefully, authoritative) to Europeans simply by co-opting some 
European cartographic conventions, a far more feasible task than acquiring sophisticated 
and expensive surveying tools and learning the intricacies of geodesy and the European 
understanding of mathematics intrinsic to it. 
5
 The trigonometric or geodetic measurements conducted during European land surveys were, at least 
ideally, the basis of Europeans' precise maps but, as seen in Chapter Two, surveyed lines were most 
important as visible claims on the landscape itself. Straight lines on Indian maps (and, indeed, many 
European ones) were not based on actual onsite measurements. 
11 
* * * 
The history of Indian territorial perceptions can be divided into three temporal 
eras, pre-contact, contact, and post-contact.6 Different groups throughout the Americas 
experienced these phases at different times, speeds, and levels of intensity, but by the 
1750s, most Indians living in what is now the eastern United States were well into the 
post-contact era. That is not to say that pre-contact aspects all disappeared; on the 
contrary, Indians and whites both made use of "traditional" Indian maps into the 
nineteenth century and Indian ideas of territorial delimitation retained many minimally-
Europeanized aspects. 
Deriving from Eurocentric notions that pre-Columbian America was in a state of 
nature, there is a common misperception that Indians did not consider land as property 
and thus had no territorial boundaries. Yet after thousands of years of American 
settlement, eastern Indians had developed complex systems of independent (and thus 
interdependent) territories divided clearly by physical features of the landscape, artificial 
landmarks, or unoccupied space between inhabited areas. Certain tracts of land, bodies 
of water, and other resources were often shared by several groups, and some Indians 
considered land rights to pertain only to the products of the land and not the land itself.7 
This situation was further complicated by the fact that many eastern groups were highly 
mobile, moving their entire communities between seasonal farming and hunting grounds. 
6
 G. Malcolm Lewis, "Maps, Mapmaking, and Map Use by Native North Americans," in The History of 
Cartography, vol. 2, book 3, "Cartography in the Traditional African, American, Arctic, Australian, and 
Pacific Societies" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 51. 
7
 Patricia Albers and Jeanne Kay, "Sharing the Land: A Study in American Indian Territoriality," in A 
Cultural Geography of North American Indians, Thomas E. Ross and Tyrel G. Moore, eds. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1987), 49; William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of 
New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 70; Gregory Nobles, "Straight Lines and Stability," 645. 
12 
Indians did not share European ideas about private property, but they did claim 
and demarcate national territory and even subdivided agricultural land into familial plots. 
In his 1749 history of North America, William Douglass wrote that "Indians are very 
jealous of their hunting and fishing Grounds or Properties," territories that were 
determined (at least in the pre-contact period) by natural or manmade boundaries. As an 
example of a nation bordered by natural landmarks, Douglas noted "our neighboring 
Nation of Abnaquies are bounded by the Atlantick Ocean, or rather at present by the 
English settlements..., by the Bay of Fundi, by the great River St. Lawrence, by Lake 
Champlain and Hudson's River."9 
Artificial landmarks were also common among pre- and post-contact Indians both 
to delineate a nation's space and to create a sense of historical attachment to that space. 
Marked trees, painted posts, and stone heaps were all used as border-markers and 
memorials. While a pile of rocks could and did designate a nation's spatial limitations, it 
might also be a monument to a long-fallen warrior, thus conflating national pride and 
sovereignty with a tract of land.10 According to historian Nancy Shoemaker, such 
landmarks served "explicitly" and "implicitly" as boundary markers because they were at 
once practical geopolitical constructions and "carried intensely felt meanings and thereby 
connected people emotionally to that place."11 
William Douglass, A summary, historical and political, of the first planting, progressive improvements, 
and present state of the British settlements in North-America (Boston: Printed and sold by Rogers and 
Fowle in Queen-Street, 1749), 155. 
9
 Ibid,. 153. 
Nancy Shoemaker, A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North American 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), 14, 27. 
11
 Ibid., 27-28. 
13 
Indians and Europeans alike shared this notion of using natural and manmade 
landmarks to designate a nation's sovereign space and they both also represented their 
surroundings with maps. Like every other known people, Indians developed maps to 
"store, communicate, and articulate concepts and facts" about their geographical, social, 
and spiritual worlds.12 Pre-contact maps used several media, including paintings on birch 
bark, skins, stones, and blazed trees, bead maps, and ephemeral maps (those sketched in 
the dirt or sand) in order to assist with wayfinding, recount historical events, coordinate 
action, or communicate a message relevant to religion or natural resources. As G. 
Malcolm Lewis has pointed out, they had no need for the formality of standardizing 
measurements or directionality, so such conventions were never developed. 
Understandability came from the use of experiential itinerant schemas like travel time, 
and topographical features served the dual purpose of landmarks and territorial 
divisions.13 
Unlike European maps, pre-contact North American maps were probably never 
created to express secular power nor to "divide their territorial world into finite areas 
comparable to the Europeans' states, territories, townships, and properties."14 By the mid 
eighteenth century, however, radical shifts in the natural and sociopolitical landscapes 
had compelled Indians to employ maps to make European-style claims within an 
increasingly European framework.15 This process of syncretism was incredibly 
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 Gregory A. Waselkov found that several Indian-made maps from the early eighteenth century, which 
have usually been understood as social-settlement maps, were in fact "political documents, graphic 
representations of the balance of power among the southeastern Indians." Although his argument evokes 
14 
influential on how Indians in eastern North America c. 1750 conceived of land and how it 
could be delineated, claimed, and represented. The impact of land transactions on this 
shift cannot be overemphasized because when the English bought, conquered, or stole 
land, they did so in European, not Indian, units. The territories exchanged in treaties and 
sales were delineated by European standards, and the more acculturated a given Indian 
group became, the more they thought of land in European terms. This shift in perspective 
was made apparent in Indian maps from this period, all of which—including bead maps 
and Neolin's spiritual chart—were heavily imbued with English elements. 
The Indians' "landscape," defined by anthropologist Eric Hirsch as the "meaning 
imputed by a local people to their cultural and physical surrounding," was also a product 
of syncretism; in fact, as in every colonial setting, acculturation of landscape perspectives 
was a two-way process, reshaping the geographic world of both Indians and English.16 
For example, the patterns of British expansion in the early years of colonization and 
along western frontiers were decided by preexisting Indian ideas of directionality and, 
more concretely, Indian guides and cartographers who led them through a familiar 
network of routes.17 English concepts of territoriality were then promulgated within this 
nexus, delineating, claiming, and reforming the physical geography at the very heart of 
Native American landscape. 
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By the 1750s, the lands of Indian groups living close to the Atlantic Ocean were 
long since bounded by European conventions and such standards were steadily moving 
west.18 Yet mapped linear boundaries tended to precede formal surveys, a circumstance 
conducive to illegal encroachments on Indian lands. After a 1762 Iroquois complaint 
about white settlement beyond a negotiated boundary that "was not yet run," one 
commentator told William Johnson that the situation provided "an opportunity of 
shewing the Indians the inconvenience of any Line Being the Boundary of an Indian Sale 
and that it should always be by natural marks."19 He knew that boundaries negotiated in 
treaties on maps had no effect if they were unaccompanied by ground level surveys, and 
without the infrastructure to inscribe these lines on the earth, natural boundaries were the 
best alternative. 
Indian groups living further west maintained a somewhat more traditional system 
of territorial division, one for which lines had little significance. The best contemporary 
description of their land system was written by Lewis Evans, a surveyor and cartographer 
who explored trans-Appalachian America in the 1740s and 50s. Evans observed that 
"Indians do not generally bound their Countries with Lines, but by considerable Extents 
of Land... the intermediate ground they reserve for their Hunting, which equally serves 
for that Purpose and a Frontier." Although each group had a distinct territory, they 
When in 1761 a spokesman for the Six Nations sought protection from settlers illegally crossing their 
boundary line, he was asked "what they meant by that Line," he was able to distinguish it clearly from 
other previous borders, Minutes of conferences, held at Easton, in August, 1761 (Philadelphia: Benjamin 
Franklin, 1761). 
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were separated by the shared space of hunting grounds, not the infinitely small lines of 
the European system. Warren Johnson (the brother of Sir William), similarly noted that 
"The Indians have particular Hunting Grounds for Each Tribe and never intrude upon 
One another's Places."21 Combined with the economic necessity of hunting and trapping, 
the role of hunting grounds as capacious territorial boundaries elucidates why Indian 
groups so frequently decried white incursions into these areas. 
Regardless of exactly how Indians defined their boundaries, it was glaringly 
obvious that they were losing land at an alarming rate, and that prompt and meaningful 
actions were necessary to preserve or reclaim their holdings. Although violent resistance 
was increasingly used to this end, maps also took on new import as tools for claiming 
Indian land by English conventions. Maps, however, usually failed to actualize these 
territorial ambitions; the most effective and durable Indian land claims survived through 
on site defense against squatters and land surveyors, not visual or written geographic 
representations. Though maps helped Indians define their own land and even promote 
solidarity within it, they had little impact on negotiations with whites. The consistent 
failure of Indian maps to secure sovereignty is clear with the benefit of hindsight, but it 
was a viable and promising option to contemporary Indian leaders. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections, each providing an 
example of how Indians sought to use maps to claim, reclaim, or reconceptualize land 
ownership. The first focuses on the Eastern Delawares who used both "traditional" 
Indian maps and modern Western ones within the highly ritualized and formulaic treaty 
maritime and inland navigations of the several rivers and lakes contained therein (Phialadelphia: Printed 
by B. Franklin and D. Hall, 1755), 11. 
21
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system to hold on to their lands in Pennsylvania's Wyoming Valley. As a people with a 
long history of being defrauded of their lands, a recent history of racial violence, and 
uncertain allegiances to both the English and their "uncles" the Six Nations, the Eastern 
Delawares were at once unique and representative of many Pennsylvanian groups 
experimenting with novel methods for retaining their rapidly diminishing claims. 
The much smaller Wappinger nation of the Hudson River valley was also forced 
to seek recognition of their lands, yet theirs had already been taken from them while 
fighting for the English during the Seven Years War. Forgoing the treaty system, the 
long-acculturated Wappingers pursued their rights through litigation and formal appeals, 
both in New York courts and in London, and hoped to use descriptive documents to 
override the white land surveys that had already carved up their homeland. 
The third group I am considering can be defined broadly as the Western Indians, 
ethnically diverse peoples living in the northwest backcountry and beyond the reach of 
British or Iroquois authority. The spiritual map made by their nativist prophet Neolin 
was not intended as a tool for negotiating territorial boundaries with the British. Instead, 
his map helped teach the Western Indians a new way of conceptualizing their territory, 
one that emphasized Indians' divine and racial right to trans-Appalachian lands. Whereas 
the map-based efforts to negotiate claims with the English failed, Neolin's map 
succeeded because it promoted solidarity and concrete action to protect territory that 
Indians came to consider a racial birthright. In effect, it helped transform the previously 
plastic cultural and territorial boundaries, often called "middle grounds," into sites of 
18 
segregation, and Indian Country became so sacred that, by 1770, many Indians would (as 
William Johnson heard one remark) "as soon lose their heads as give up their land." 
* * * 
By the time of the Treaty of Easton in 1756, the Delawares had a long history of 
lost lands and lost sovereignty. At some point in the seventeenth century, they were 
officially subjugated by the Six Nations of the Iroquois and given the symbolic role of 
women, a collective identity that implied their inability to conduct independent land 
deals. The English recognized and supported the hegemony of the Iroquois, who sold 
off much of the Delawares' land for their own advantage. The Walking Purchase of 1737 
was a particularly onerous manifestation of this arrangement, one that the Delawares 
made into a charged political symbol.24 It created powerful associations between their 
status as clients of the Six Nations, their label as women, and white encroachment on 
9S 
their lands that contributed directly to the eruption of racial violence in 1755. 
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White encroachment and political subjugation also prompted many Delawares to 
seek a distant new home. This faction "jump'd over Allegeny Hills, and settled on the 
waters of Ohio... a Country that the Most High had created for the poor Indians, and not 
for the White People."26 These Western Delawares (including Neolin) were instrumental 
in developing the nativist notion that the West was "Indian Country," yet those who 
chose to stay in Pennsylvania, the Eastern Delawares, also sought to secure their land 
rights, first through violence and, when that failed, through traditional diplomatic 
channels. 
In 1755, the Delawares "proclaimed war against all the English and threaten not 
to leave one of them alive; and assign, as a reason for this, that they have been too long 
treated by the Six Nations, to whom they are subject, as women, but will now show them 
that they are men."27 Led by "king" Teedyuscung, the Eastern Delawares wreaked havoc 
along the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Maryland in an aggressive war that conflated 
their increasingly racist hatred of the English with independence from the Six Nations 
and the desire for recognized land rights, issues often discussed with highly gendered 
language. The Delawares thus told an Iroquois delegate that "we are men and determined 
not be ruled any longer by you as women, and we are determined to cut off all the 
English except those that make their escape from us in ships."28 This reference to leaving 
by sea is significant for it implies that the entirety of American land was Indian property 
that must be purged of the English, a trope that became common among nativists. 
26
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Despite such rhetorical boasts, being a tributary of the Iroquois was a convenient 
foil, and the Delawares were quick to aver their dependency on or independency of the 
Six Nations if either stance seemed likely to support their land claims. At the Treaties of 
Easton (1756, 1757, 1758, and 1761), the Treaty of Harris' Ferry (1757), and the Treaty 
of Lancaster (1762), Teedyuscung, the Delawares' primary spokesman, usually invoked 
Iroquois dominance to procure protection for their territory in the Wyoming Valley, land 
owned by the Six Nations on which they settled the Delawares displaced by the Walking 
Purchase.29 
In the 1750s and 1760s, the Wyoming Valley in Pennsylvania (not to be confused 
with the present state of Wyoming) was a site of territorial conflict among white settlers, 
English officials, the Iroquois, and their tributaries that foreshadowed the large scale 
disputes that accompanied white expansion into Ohio. Squatters who were moving to the 
Wyoming valley had little regard for colonial authority and, due in part to a sense of 
betrayal following the Indian attacks of 1755, had developed a powerful ideology of 
Indian hating.30 Well aware of the threat these squatters posed to the Delawares' land 
and lives, Teedyuscung worked within the traditional Anglo-Indian treaty system (an 
arrangement that required acknowledging Iroquois leadership) in order to gain British 
and Iroquois recognition and protection of the Delawares' holdings in the Wyoming 
valley. Maps were a crucial aspect of this effort. 
See for example: Minutes of conferences, held with the Indians, at Easton, in the months of July and 
November, 1756 (Philadelphia: Benjamin Franklin and David Hall, 1757), 11.; Minutes of conferences, 
held at Easton, in August, 1761 (Philadelphia: Benjamin Franklin, 1761), 6, 15. 
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It merits mention that Teedyuscung was himself a fascinating figure, a dynamic 
and well documented personality in a story too often filled by nameless Indians sharing a 
collective national or even racial identity. In his time as leader of the Eastern Delawares, 
he vacillated between allegiances to the French and the English, affirmation and denial of 
Iroquois domination, and professed Christianity and pragmatic religious ambivalence. 
A bombastic speaker, Teedyuscung was known for dramatic overnight changes in 
opinion, hard drinking, and a self-righteous air of importance. Although they had not 
met, William Johnson believed "[Teedyuscung] speaks of himself in a Stile of 
Consequence which...belongs to no single Indian upon the Continent," and claimed the 
authority to represent some Indian nations that Johnson had never heard of and others that 
"don't know there is such a man in the world as Tediuscung."32 Although he had 
"imposed himself [at treaties] as a man of much greater importance than he really is," 
Johnson, Pennsylvania delegates, and the Iroquois recognized that Teedyuscung pulled 
clout and that even if his authority and allegiances were tenuous, he was still "capable of 
doing a great deal of mischief."33 
Most important for this study, however, was his readiness to employ both 
indigenous and English conventions to secure his territory within the Anglicized land 
system. Contrary to traditional treaty protocol, Teedyuscung demanded his own 
amanuensis to write and read messages and record minutes independently of the officially 
appointed clerk. According to Jane T. Merritt, Teedyuscung was at the forefront of a 
31
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shift among Indians from using wampum belts and oral culture to western style 
documents, a change indicative of "the increasing need to control the outcomes of these 
negotiations."34 Although he continued to use traditional diplomatic tools, including the 
wampum map described below, his co-option of the written word and western 
conventions in his land dealings was a crucial step in the shift from treaty diplomacy to 
litigations in colonial courts, like those conducted by the Wappingers in the 1760s. 
Although the treaties at Easton, Lancaster, and Harris' Ferry between 1756 and 
1762 were distinct meetings with many different diplomatic goals, they were most 
important for the Eastern Delawares as negotiations for the Wyoming Valley, dealings 
inextricably tied up with their recent attacks on the English. The brutality of the attacks, 
combined with fear of further alliance with the French, made the British more willing to 
accommodate the Delawares than ever before, and Teedyuscung took advantage of the 
fear and respect engendered by the fighting to aver his land claims. 
Although Johnson and other British officials blamed the Delawares' "treachery 
and ingratitude" on French intrigue, Teedyuscung shifted the catalyst for their attacks to 
white greed for land. The Six Nations, themselves fearful of white expansion, 
supported Teedyuscung, telling the English at Harris' Ferry that "you, covetous of land, 
made plantations [at Wyoming] and spoiled their hunting grounds; they then complained 
to us and... we found their complaints to be true... you drove them back into the arms of 
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35
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the French." The English officials at these treaties were genuinely interested in 
ameliorating whatever prompted the atrocities of 1755-6, and thus took seriously the 
Delawares' claims. 
The first of these was made at Easton in 1756. Seeking to draw attention to land 
issues as the fount of anti-English violence, Teedyuscung presented Pennsylvania's 
lieutenant-governor Robert Hunter Morris with a wampum belt, a map of the Delawares' 
position in Wyoming. 
Teedyuscung then explained the belt, saying it was sent him by the Six Nations and 
he accepted of it: you see, says he, a square in the Middle, meaning the Lands of the 
Indians; and at one end a man, indicating the English; and at the other End another, 
meaning the French; our Uncles told us both these coveted our lands, but let us join 
and defend our lands against both.37 
The Delawares and Six Nations considered the Wyoming Valley a literal middle ground 
between two aggressive white empires; an inconvenient home for the Delawares yet an 
important buffer zone against white expansion for the Six Nations. 
Although the belt is far from geographically precise, it is nevertheless a legitimate 
map, one that sent a powerful message about the political importance of keeping the 
Delawares at Wyoming. If the English were to drive off the Delawares, not only would 
they lose an important bulwark against the French in the west, but the Delawares would 
surely re-ally with the French ("the Enemies of Mankind") and the frontier atrocities 
Minutes of conferences, held with the Indians, at Harris's Ferry, and at Lancaster, in March, April, and 
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would begin anew. Teedyuscung had occasion to emphasize the importance of securing 
the Delawares' borders that same day when Morris, after receiving the belt, complained 
to him that four whites had just been killed by "enemy Indians" near Susquehana. Not 
one to mince words, Teedyuscung responded that "if his People were so foolish as to 
come on our Borders at this Time, and were killed anyhow, they must take the Reward of 
their Folly."41 Nevertheless, he still felt it necessary to emphasize that "none of these 
private Deaths ought to affect [their] publick Measure."42 
At the 1756 Treaty of Easton, Teedyuscung tried to capitalize on the Delawares' 
unusually strong bargaining power and the encouraging reception of the wampum belt 
and their Wyoming Valley claim to reassert their right territory lost in the Walking 
Purchase. To accomplish this, he utilized another of the traditional treaty protocols for 
conveying a geographic message, a stylized speech accompanied by gifts of wampum 
strings.43 "This very Ground that is under me (striking it with his Foot) was my Land and 
Inheritance and is taken from me, by Fraud; when I say the Ground, I mean all the Land 
lying between Tohicon Creek and Wioming, on the River Susquehannah.'^ It is 
Minutes of conferences, held with the Indians, at Harris's Ferry * and at Lancaster, in March, April, and 
May, 1757, 18. 
40
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significant to note that Teedyuscung then identified the fraud as occurring during the land 
survey following the Walk, when "the young Proprietaries came and got [the boundary] 
run by a straight Course by the Compass, and by that Means took in double the Quantity 
intended to be sold."45 This reference to surveyors and their instruments as the executors 
of territorial dispossession was such a common theme that, as early as the late 1740s, 
surveyors were subjects of suspicion and resentment, a theme that will be addressed 
further in the next chapter.46 Fearing more attacks by the Delawares, the English were 
eager to please and readily acknowledged "the transaction of that Walk was...universally 
given up as unfair, and not to be defended."47 Nevertheless, these lands had long-since 
been sold, surveyed, and occupied, and despite the underhandedness of the Walk, 
Teedyuscung's claims had no legal authority.48 
Unlike the land lost in the Walk, the Wyoming Valley still belonged legally to the 
Six Nations who reserved it for the Delawares, yet white settlement continued to increase 
there and Teedyuscung continued to press the Delawares' rights to that territory. His 
deep-seated impression that the Wyoming Valley was Delaware land—combined with his 
new persona as an important dignitary—led him to have his personal secretary draft the 
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"Draught of land desired by the Delawares," an inexact yet decidedly western-style map 
that he presented at Easton in 1757 to clarify exactly which territories he claimed.49 That 
this map was made only one year after the wampum map evinces just how urgent the 
need to secure Wyoming had become. 
In a letter to William Johnson, Governor William Denny explained the content of 
the "paper purporting to be a Draught of Lands [Teedyuscung] requested might be 
granted to them for their habitation," first shown to Johnson's agent George Croghan in 
1757.50 The lands Teedyuscung desired did not include those lost in the Walking 
Purchase, but "about 2 million of acres" around Wyoming: 
the courses began a little below Shamokin...then by the Boundary Line of the 
Purchase of 1749 to the mouth of Lehighwachsen...then in a straight line...to 
Burnest's Hills [and following them] to the Big Island on the West branch, then... to 
the place of beginning about a mile south of Shamokin.51 
The map was obviously the work of an amateur cartographer and it lacked the 
conventions of a graticule or a precise scale. Yet it had ruled lines, prominent landmarks 
like forts, mountains, and rivers, descriptive captions, standard directionality (north is at 
the top of the page), and it was drawn on paper, the proper medium of the West. 
The most obvious reason for Teedyuscung's quick transition from traditional to 
European mapping conventions was the failure of the wampum belt and formal oratory to 
secure recognition of Wyoming. Yet the more important factor was the shift in what the 
Delawares hoped to achieve with their maps. The wampum belt expressed political 
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relationships to international powers, geographic-imperial entities whose size and 
complexity defied "realistic" depictions and were best understood symbolically. 
Although the wampum map masterfully expressed how the Delawares inhabited a 
political and geographic middle ground in 1756, by 1757 they were far more concerned 
with the apolitical white settlers who were "daily encreasing their Settlements" in the 
Wyoming Valley.52 The purpose of Teedyuscung's "Draught" was thus to solidify the 
Eastern Delawares' territorial boundaries. With bordered lands, the Delawares could 
follow the Six Nation's advice and "use [their] best Endeavors to defend [their] Frontiers, 
and protect the Lives of [their] People," while also securing recognized territorial 
limitations that they hoped the colonial authorities would be obligated to enforce.53 
By the 1762 Treaty of Lancaster, it had been decided that the Delawares were not 
to receive exclusive rights to Wyoming, but would be allowed to continue living there 
under the aegis of the Six Nations. For Teedyuscung, the culmination of six years of 
work within the Anglo-Indian treaty system, using both traditional and modernized 
geographic aids, did not produce the desired result. Over sixty years old with a broken 
spirit and a "habit of drunkenness," he resigned himself and the Eastern Delawares to the 
fate handed down by a delegate from the Six Nations, one presented in the very treaty 
rhetoric that had failed Teedyuscung: 
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I make a fire for Teedyuscung, at Wyoming; I tell him to sit by the fireside, and 
watch that Fire; but I do not Give it to him, for our English Brethren cast an eye upon 
that land; therefore I say to Teedyuscung, watch that Fire, and if any White People 
come there, tell them to go away, for that land belongs to your Uncles, the Six 
Nations.54 
This conventional use of the language of council fires would have a sad irony for 
Teedyuscung. While he was passed out drunk one night in April of 1763, armed settlers 
from Connecticut, probably incited by members of the Susquehanna land company, 
raided his town in Wyoming, driving out the Delawares with a simple show of brute force 
that overrode the intricacies of a half-decade of politics and treaties.55 The settlers set fire 
to the village, and burned Teedyuscung to death in his cabin. 
Immediately after this murder, his son, Captain Bull, took swift revenge against 
the English, first capturing and burning alive several of the settlers and then leading a war 
party that joined Pontiac's forces of Western Indians. He directed his party's efforts at 
these same settlers and, as historian Anthony Wallace put it, "by the end of the dark and 
bloody year 1763, no white men lived on the grassy plains of Wyoming."5 Such 
episodes of atrocities and evermore brutal reprisals reflected and propagated the racial 
animosity of the backcountry, a situation that became so dire that total racial separation 
through formally mapped boundaries seemed to be the only possible solution. As seen in 
the next chapter, these grand efforts only aggravated frontier racism further. 
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* * * 
The Delawares were not, of course, the only Indian group being forcibly run off 
of their land. After serving with Great Britain during the Seven Years War, the 
Wappingers—a nation of about four hundred Indians living in eastern New York— 
returned to their homes in Dutchess County to find their land claimed by some of the 
province's most powerful landlords. Although most of the Wappingers took this as their 
cue to relocate and merged with the diverse Stockbridge Indians, some, including their 
chief Captain Daniel Nimham, chose to stay in the east and defend their rightful property. 
The small farmers who lived there were eager to oblige them; they recognized 
that the Indians were the land's legal owners and, more importantly, the Indians offered 
better terms in their leases. Furthermore, white settlers and Indians both resented the 
great patentees, who used what Alan Taylor described as "fraudulent documents and 
creative surveys" to monopolize the New York landscape.57 When their tenants stopped 
paying rent, the patentees Philip Philipse, Beverly Robinson, and Roger Morris decided it 
was time to remove the competition: 
without any manner of legal warrant, or authority for so doing... [they] collected a 
body of upwards of two hundred men, or soldiers... all well armed and supplied with 
ammunition...[and] marched against these poor defenseless people...drove them out 
before them [and] burnt and destroyed [the] homes of this poor, but loyal people.58 
Needless to say, the tenants once more paid their rent to the patentees. 
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The patentees supported their own rights with a highly suspect seventeenth 
century deed of sale to Adolph Philipse in which the Wappingers supposedly sold him 
"Philipse Upper Patent," yet their strongest claim was that the land had already been 
surveyed by and for wealthy whites. A letter to William Johnson from one Catharyna 
Brett, a widow with sizable lands in the Upper Patent, described the survey that took 
place in the 1730s. The governor had presented Philipse's deed to the Wappingers who 
insisted that Philipse never ratified that document before his death. In order to support 
her claims, "the Governor Desired [Brett] to have that Part Surveyed so that the Indians 
might be convinced of the Bounds."59 Thus Cadwallader Colden, then surveyor-general 
of New York, came to survey the patent, "but was Soon repulsed by a Company of Drunk 
Indians...who threatened to break his compass and he was Stoped."60 Brett eventually 
paid off "Old Nimham," Daniel's father, and "with much difficulty" the survey was 
finally accomplished.61 In retrospect, the Wappingers would have been wise to continue 
resisting that survey. Territorial maps and deeds could be disputed in courts of law but, 
like the forcible ousting of the Wappingers after the Seven Years War, the physical 
reality of surveys had an air of permanence that litigation could not easily undo. The 
significance of surveys and less formal onsite claims is explored in Chapters II and III. 
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Nevertheless, the Wappingers had good reason to believe that they could reclaim 
this land. They were acculturated to the English land system to such a degree that they 
too delineated land into plots for white tenants and, unlike the Delawares, had a long 
history of loyal service to Britain and friendship with the provincial government. In fact, 
at the 1756 Treaty of Easton, Teedyuscung spoke "on behalf of the Wapings... and 
produced a short broad belt of white wampum, having in the center two hearts of reddish 
color, and in figures 1745, wrote after the following manner, 1 7 w 4 5 " that a former 
New York governor had given to the Wappingers.63 Not only is this an interesting 
episode in which whites used a mixture of English and Indian traditions to express a 
geographic and political relationship (Teedyuscung said "the belt...represented union"), 
it also shows how the Wappingers were too insignificant to speak for themselves within 
the Anglo-Indian treaty system.64 
As neither William Johnson nor the Iroquois had much interest in protecting the 
rights of "long domesticated" Indians with "several old titles," the Wappingers sought to 
reclaim their lands through formal, document-based litigation within the colonial legal 
system. Besides, the long acculturated Wappingers, who were themselves landlords 
within the English land system, probably felt as comfortable in provincial courts as 
dealing with the formalities and rhetoric of treaties. Daniel Nimham thus defended the 
Wappinger's land with a stack of documents and a white lawyer, Samuel Monroe, tools 
Minutes of conferences, held with the Indians, at Easton, in the months of July and November, 1756, 31. 
64
 Nimham and forty-six other Wappingers were at Easton in 1756, but all of their land dealings were 
conducted through the Six Nations. 
32 
that evinced the foil co-option of English legal conventions, especially the written word. 
The supposed power of the word had such a hold over the Wappingers that, when asked 
to produce a description of their claim at the retrial of 1767, the Wappingers—as seen 
below—decided to present a written instead of a graphic map, a choice that would have 
been alien to them a few decades earlier. 
The first man that Nimham and Monroe sought for support was the erstwhile 
surveyor and current lieutenant-governor Cadwallader Colden.66 William Johnson 
granted them a pass to visit Colden, "who they hoped and expected would do them 
justice, as they imagined he must, (from his surveying the same) be well acquainted with 
the state of the Case."67 Although Colden had issued a royal proclamation in 1761 that 
"fraudulent purchases [from Indians] may be recovered by a due course of law," he was 
nonetheless far from receptive of the case Nimham brought against Beverly Robinson, 
Philip Philpse, and Robert Morris on March 6, 1765. Despite his primary role in the 
disputed survey, Colden and his council all sided with the patentees, ordered the 
Wappingers off of their land, and even threw their lawyer in jail without trial. 
Petitioning Johnson from New York's "New Gaol," Monroe complained that 
despite producing "several papers, and vouchers to attest to the truth of such their 
complaints, and Right to said Lands," they were nonetheless denied their property by 
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biased judges. He went on to plea for Johnson's intervention, without which the 
Wappingers would remain deprived of their land and Monroe would remain incarcerated, 
a situation he blamed on the council's efforts "to stop [him] from going to England as 
70 
[he] intended with the Indians in order that they might be reinstated in their rights." 
The lawyer's prison sentence can be understood as a deliberate effort to deprive Indians 
of the power of the written word, a technology from which Teedyuscung had also hoped 
to benefit by employing a personal secretary. Unlike Teedyuscung's clerk, however, 
Monroe threatened provincial administrators with accountability to Whitehall, and in 
order to avoid censure for their self-interested rulings, they "sentenced [him] to Gaol by 
Mittimus."71 
The patentee Robert Morris also wrote Johnson in an effort to dissuade him from 
getting involved, claiming that Monroe himself was responsible for inciting the 
79 
Wappingers to press illegitimate claims. Johnson needed little persuading. He told 
Morris that 
I have laid it down as an invariable rule...that whenever a Title is set up by any tribe 
of Indians of little consequence or importance to his Majesty's interests, and who 
may be considered as long domesticated, that such claims...had better remain 
unsupported...on the contrary, whenever I find a just complaint made by a people 
either by themselves or connections capable of resenting and who I know would 
resent a neglect, I judged it my duty to support the same.73 






Even without Johnson's support, Nimham was eventually able to travel to London 
in 1766, where the lords of trade and Lord Shelburne deigned to support his cause and 
enjoined Johnson to do so as well, a responsibility which he still shunned and thus passed 
off to his son Guy. In his instruction to Guy, Johnson did advise him to "afford them the 
general benefit of my countenance," but put far more emphasis on preventing the dispute 
from "creating any disturbance...among the Interior Nations."74 Like many colonists in 
the years following Pontiac's War, Johnson feared that upsetting the western nativists 
would lead to a general Indian conflict.75 
Neither Guy Johnson's presence nor the presentation of even more formal 
documents had any impact at the 1767 retrial. In his ever elusive pursuit of legitimacy 
through the written word, Nimham and his council provided Governor Sir Henry Moore 
with a written map of the lands they hoped to reclaim. 
[The Wappinger's] tract of land, situate, lying, and being in the southernmost part of 
Dutchess County... [is] about two hundred thousand acres; bounded westerly by a 
tract of land formerly conveyed ...by a deed from one Aughekenage...northerly by 
land, formerly granted to Col. Sephanus Van Cortland...southerly by Cortland's 
Manor...and extending easterly about seventeen miles, and is about sixteen miles in 
width.76 
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This written description was a far more accurate claim than even Teedyuscung's 
"Draught," for it included all of the niceties of English convention, including precise 
borders with other legal plots and measurements in the standard units of miles and acres. 
Just as Teedyuscung found the supposed power of maps to be illusionary, so did 
Nimham discover that the European technology of the written word was equally 
incapable of reuniting the Wappingers with their land. The governor and the other 
members of the council shared the same territorial interests as the patentees, thus gave 
credence to their bogus documents and unanimously declared that "the Indians now 
77 
living of the Wappinger tribe, have no Right, Title, or Claims to the Lands granted." 
There was a significant amount of public outcry against this case. The most 
outspoken of these, A Geographic, historical summary; or, Narrative of the present 
controversy, between the Wappinger tribe of Indians, and the claimants..., was published 
soon after the 1767 hearing by an anonymous author who was quite familiar with this 
case. Although most of the details of this pamphlet involved legal nuances and 
impassioned outbursts about how this "poor, but loyal people" were ill-used, the title of 
this piece, by emphasizing geography before history, was a keen insight that land itself, 
not the deeds or formal claims to it, was at the heart of this dispute.78 "Who doth not 
know, that something besides the absolute decree of the Judges is requisite to the creation 
and confirmation of a title to lands; and that for any court to say that the land of A 
belongs to B doth not make it so in reality."79 Surveys and martial prowess had made the 
77
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Wappingers' lands into white lands, and litigation— no matter how infused with English 
norms—was not going to reclaim it. 
As for the Wappingers, most soon merged with the eclectic Indian communities at 
Stockbridge, yet they did have one more opportunity to show the English the extent of 
their resentment. In 1778, Captain Nimham and a force of about sixty Wappingers sided 
with the American rebels and set out to join George Washington's army. As Colin 
Calloway notes, the Wappingers and other Indian groups had very real grievances against 
the aristocracy and politicians, and the Revolution gave them a chance to resolve through 
on 
bloodshed what they could not through litigation and co-opted geographic technologies. 
En route to join the Continental Army, Nimham and his band were ambushed by British 
soldiers and almost half of their numbers were killed, including Nimham and one of his 
sons. The rest returned to Stockbridge and a future of western removal. 
* * * 
Although incorporating geographic documents into land negotiations was 
becoming increasingly common and necessary in the white-dominated colonial east, 
Indians living along the borderlands and further west continued to use maps mostly for 
pre-contact purposes. There had been some English-made maps of the West, and a few 
surveyors like Christopher Gist and George Washington even tried to demarcate onsite 
claims for themselves and ambitious land companies. Despite such incursions, Indian 
maps and spatial conceptions remained the norm west of the Alleghenies until English 
Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native 
American Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 88. 
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victory in the Seven Years War dramatically changed how Indians and English interacted 
in this region. 
In the years leading up to the French and Indian War, a wide variety of previously 
disparate tribes from the east, south, and northwest migrated to this region to escape 
white encroachment, harvest the plentiful hunting grounds, and do business with British 
traders who had followed the Delawares into the West. They were joined on the frontier 
by Europeans of various backgrounds, themselves venturing west in search of free or 
cheap land and to settle beyond the reach of any real colonial influence. These Scots-
Irish, German, English, and Swedish groups tended to settle in homogeneous 
communities in which, overtime, a sense of ethnic identity would mature in opposition to 
their Indian neighbors, whose villages were inhabited by Indians of various tribal 
backgrounds. The multiethnic Indian communities, however, became hotbeds of Pan-
Indianism where ethnic distinctions, such as Shawnee or German, were insignificant 
compared to the broad racial groupings of Indian and white. 
The Seven Years War and its aftermath engendered an unprecedented degree of 
Indian/white racial tension and also forced Indians to re-evaluate their place (both 
politically and geographically) in a suddenly French-less North America. As Gregory 
Dowd argued, this crisis of status pertained both to their secular and spiritual worlds, 
drawing the two together to a point where their geographical territory was also a religious 
and racial promised land.82 The novel political and social uncertainties were manifested 
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with Pontiac's War while the related spiritual concerns led many Indians to be more 
attentive to the teachings of nativist prophets, charismatic religious leaders who had been 
preaching throughout the backcountry since the 1740s. The most renowned of these was 
Neolin, a Delaware who used a deerskin map to help explain a politico-religious doctrine 
about banishing the English and their Christian God from Indian country. 
A Delaware Living in Tuscarawas Town in the Ohio country, Neolin was well 
placed to build off of developing notions of racial distinction. His journey to visit the 
Creator and the visions he received have been well documented elsewhere, but suffice it 
to say that he claimed to meet the Master of Life who gave him instructions regarding 
how to restore the Indians to an idealized pre-contact civilization by rejecting white 
people, materials, and religion.83 The focus of this study, however, is his 
"cosmographical map,"84 a tool that not only elaborated his philosophy to contemporaries 
but also allows an historian to draw out the pertinent aspects of his preaching and 
influence. I will thus focus on the three most detailed contemporary descriptions of the 
map, those of James Kenny, John Heckewelder, and John McCullough, to examine the 
tenets of nativism, white influences on it, and the reconceptualization of trans-
Appalachian America as a place of Indian sovereignty. 
The design of Neolin's map was characteristic of both Indian and Christian 
spiritual charts, yet by fusing nativism's racial unity with a sense of geographic and 
heavenly sovereignty, it took on a politically assertive role not found in earlier western 
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Indian maps. With the departure of the French from the continent, western Indians were 
faced with the same challenge as eastern ones, to assert their territorial sovereignty in the 
face of a single potentially dominant power. Yet whereas eastern groups tried to use 
English conventions to claim their land in what had become an English landscape, leaders 
like Pontiac and Neolin tried to ensure that their negotiations would take place on Indian 
terms in Indian country. Neolin's map was the medium that best explained to western 
Indians their new political status and proselytized a faith that allowed them to come to 
terms with it by taking pride in their racial heritage and guarding against white 
expansion. By inciting Indians to defend a racial and religious homeland against ground 
level dispossession, Neolin's spiritual map proved a more effective and lasting means of 
claiming land than those used by Teedyuscung or Nimham. 
The Moravian missionary John Heckewelder described how: 
in 1762, there was a famous preacher of the Dealaware nation, who... traveled about 
the country, among the Indians, endeavoring to persuade them that he had been 
appointed by the great Spirit... to point out to them the offences by which they had 
drawn his displeasure, and the means by which they might recover his favour in the 
future. He had drawn... a kind of map on a piece of deer skin, which he called "the 
great Book or Writing."... This map he held before him while preaching, frequently 
pointing to particular marks and spots upon it, and giving explanations as he went 
along.85 
The "offenses" to the Master of Life that Neolin most often cited were similar to those 
condemned by earlier nativist prophets, especially the corruptive effects of alcohol, but 
he went further in prohibiting the use of guns and even flint and steel as a fire starter.86 
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Indians were thus to begin training with bows and arrows and keeping to a strict diet of 
dried meat, corn, and an emetic made from bitter roots meant "to purge out all that they 
got of ye White peoples ways & Nature."87 In short, the goal was to revert to a 
romanticized pre-contact Indian culture so as to "return to that former happy state, in 
which [Indians] lived in peace and plenty, before these strangers came to disturb 
[them]."88 Yet centuries of white influence and the idealized nativist version of the 
Indian's past not only made Neolin's vision practically impossible, but he also supported 
the inclusion of specific elements of white culture and censured some that were native in 
origin. Handshaking and drinking alcohol in moderation were tolerated while polygamy 
and traditions such as the medicine dance were banned.89 
The two most important aspects of white culture incorporated into Neolin's 
nativist vision were European methods of knowledge dissemination and Christianity, 
both of which were explicit in his map. Neolin promoted literacy so that his followers 
would be able to read a prayer given to him by the Master of Life, but most of his 
congregation was illiterate and he thus used his map as the primary means of 
proselytizing. He had the map reproduced on "Dress'd Leather Skin & some on paper" in 
such abundance that the captive John McCullough personally saw an Indian made "copy 
of [Neolin's] hieroglyphics, as numbers of them had got them copyed and undertook to 
an account of their manners, customs, traditions, religious sentiments, mode of warfare, military tactics, 
discipline and encampments, treatment of prisoners, &c..., Archibald Loudon, ed., (Carlisle, PA: From the 
Press of A. Loudon, 1808 (1888 printing)), 273. 
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preach, or instruct others." In fact, Heckewelder quoted Neolin as saying "I advise you 
to preserve, in every family, at least, such a book or writing as this, which I will finish off 
for you, provided you bring me the price."91 Although this provocative statement 
suggests Neolin had no problem serving both the Master of Life and Mammon, the active 
diffusion of his map among would be followers demonstrates the complex fusion of 
native and white elements in his theology. 
As Jane T. Merritt points out, the co-option and dissemination of religious 
documents, whether drawn or written, showed how Indians used white religious 
conventions to promote nativist revivals, and that these documents then changed how 
Indian religions were understood and practiced. The dispersal of spiritual literature and 
charts, especially one of such a prominent prophet as Neolin, standardized hitherto 
diverse local practices into a more standardized form. This, after all, was part of Neolin's 
vision; spreading his map helped ensure that his teachings would become the Indian 
religion practiced by the Indian race in Indian country. One Delaware warrior bore 
witness to Neolin's success in this ambition, claiming "that its agree'd to by their Whole 
Nation, to follow their new Plan of Religion."93 Reproducing the map allowed Neolin's 
anti-white teachings to reach a large audience of Western Indians, making it an effective 
means of promoting solidarity and defiance against British power. 
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White culture not only impacted the means by which Neolin spread his vision, but 
was very influential on the very tenets of his supposedly all-Indian religion and the map 
used to relate it. Although spiritual maps and spirit journeys were longstanding elements 
in Indian religion and cartography, Christian missionaries used similar diagrams to 
overcome the barriers of translation and illiteracy in order to preach a boiled down 
version of the gospel, the outstanding features of which were the alternate choices 
between heaven and hell.94 
This sort of dichotomous view of good and evil was alien to pre-contact Indian 
religions, yet Neolin's chart had paths that led to damnation overseen by the devil and a 
precarious "avenue" to heaven which, in most accounts of the map, was blocked by 
whites. James Kenny, a Quaker trader, described the map as having 
ye Earth at ye Bottom & heaven at ye top, having a straight Line from One to ye 
Other, by which their forefathers use'd to assend to Hapiness. Abo1 ye middle is like a 
Long Square cuting thire way to Hapiness, at right Angles, & stoping them 
representing ye White people, ye outside is a Long Squair like black Stroke 
Circomscribing ye Whole within it, & joyning on ye left Hand Issuing from ye White 
peoples place is cut many Strokes parralel to thire Squair or Situation, all these 
Strokes represents all ye Sins & Vices which ye Indians have learned from ye White 
people, through which now they must go, ye Good Road being Stopt. Hell being 
fixed not far off, there they are Led irrevocibly.95 
McCullough and Heckewelder also include heaven and hell in their analyses of the map, 
the former having three increasingly hot levels of hell as well as a soothing "spring of 
water... as if they had some idea of the Popish tenet of Purgatory" while Heckewelder's 
had both a "great Spirit" and an "evil spirit" who kept "a continual watch for Indians."96 
94
 Dowd, War Under Heaven, 99. 
95
 Kenny, "Journal," 171. 
96
 McCullough, "A Narrative of the Captivity," 275; Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs..., 292. 
43 
Neolin did not, however, simply copy white media and messages. As Alfred A. 
Cave argues, he incorporated select elements of Christianity within an existing Indian 
framework in order to best fit perceived contemporary needs.97 The goal that Neolin 
hoped to achieve was geographic, racial, and religious unity, thus the replacement of the 
myriad lesser divinities with one "Jehovah-like supreme deity"98 who created Indians as a 
single race helped to integrate the ethnically diverse groups of Indian country. 
Furthermore, by co-opting the devil and a fiery Dantean hell and conflating them with 
white people and goods, Neolin's map drew a lucid, elegant, and influential connection 
between whites, damnation, and the necessity of securing Indian sovereignty in the West. 
In his account of the chart, McCullough explained its dual purpose of "denoting 
the probation that human beings were subjected to whilst living on earth, and also, 
denoting something of a future state."99 It is unclear if by "a future state" McCullough 
meant the Indians' vision of the afterlife or some future political state, yet this very 
ambiguity says much about how interconnected the two concepts were in Neolin's pan-
Indianism. The fact that McCullough had Neolin saying "that by following his 
instructions, they would, in a few years, be able to drive the white people out of their 
country" makes it clear that Neolin believed an aggressive defense of Indian country to 
be integral to his wider cosmology.100 As Pontiac's War of 1763 demonstrated, Neolin 
was not alone in this sentiment. His map, a widely spread and very clear message drawn 
by and for Indians, was an indispensable catalyst to this conflict. 
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Like the maps used in land dealings further east, Neolin's incorporated many 
European elements, yet much of it and Neolin's success can be attributed to using the 
map to promote an Indian landscape among Indians, not merely maintain Indian-owned 
land within an otherwise English landscape and land system. Although western Indians 
would eventually lose trans-Appalachian Indian country to white encroachment, that 
process also owed surprisingly little to English-made maps that tried to Europeanize the 
western landscape from afar. Indians only lost the west when surveyors and squatters 
made tangible claims to it. Even after Pontiac's defeat, preventing and resisting these 
onsite delineations proved an effective means for western Indians to protect the well-




"WE HAVE ALTERED THE COURSE A LITTLE": OFFICIAL LAND SURVEYS 
AND INDIAN AGENCY 
Although American Indians developed syncretic maps that they hoped could 
actualize official territorial boundaries, Indians lacked the specialized European 
knowledge systems and technologies necessary to conduct precise land surveys. Linear 
surveying relied on a European conception of space, one that understood all observable 
space to be part of the surface area of a spherical earth. This surface area was infinitely 
divisible by standard geometric figures, the accuracy of which could be confirmed with 
reference to heavenly bodies. Learned British and creole officials in North America 
shared this manner of understanding geography and space, and believed that precise 
observations and the scientific endeavors based upon them would reflect the natural order 
of the universe. In this era of precision, geometrically and astronomically measured 
boundary lines were the height of geographical achievement, a means of inscribing 
European ideas of order directly onto the American landscape. 
It is ironic, then, that these high-tech surveys based on European knowledge 
systems provided Indians with some of the most significant opportunities to determine 
the shape of their territories. Just as the formal Indian maps examined in the previous 
chapter relied on the approval of white officials, so too could western land surveys be 
prevented or modified by Indians. Exerting onsite influence over surveyors allowed 
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Indians to make de facto changes as to where border lines were run, alterations that could 
forgo the official treaty system and, by their physical presence on the landscape, demand 
recognition. Although maps were the geographical technology with which Indians were 
most proficient, Indians could determine the location of boundary lines most effectively 
through official surveys. 
In the 1760s and early 1770s, no colonial boundary line was more important for 
either Indians or whites than that meant to segregate the two races. Amidst the racial 
violence that followed the Seven Years War, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 created the 
Indian Boundary Line, a map-based border that designated the Appalachian Mountains as 
the frontier between the all-white east and Indian country.1 It soon became clear, though, 
that this border was ineffectual, and plans were made to relocate the boundary line in a 
way that could stop frontier violence, regulate speculation and settlement, and—for 
Indians—create authoritative territorial bounds that would secure their autonomy. 
For the white officials who negotiated the Indian Boundary Line, it was 
imperative that the finalized boundary would be inscribed on the landscape. Not only 
would this create a visible ground-level border that would be clear to both Indians and 
whites and (hopefully) dissuade either race from crossing into the other's territory, but it 
also would fulfill the geographic standards by which educated whites made sense of 
space. This task naturally fell to professional surveyors. By virtue of their precise 
measurements, the boundary would be authoritative both at ground level and when 
translated onto globes and maps. Furthermore, precise boundary lines provided a frame 
within which surveyors could conduct cadastral surveys, those that delineated a given 
1
 This was not the first time racial boundaries had been made between Indians and white; such divisions 
were created after the 1644 Powhatan-English War and after King Philip's War of 1676. It was, though, 
the first time a royal edict tried dividing all Indians from all whites. 
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space into ownable plots, a prerequisite for those who hoped to profit from acquiring 
trans-Appalachian lands. 
The very necessity of onsite surveys to this European-style land system provided 
both Indians and the surveyors themselves with unexpected prospects for undermining 
official plans for boundary lines that had already been settled on maps. The boundaries 
had to be physically measured and marked in the west, a region in which British authority 
was tenuous and unable to ensure that the officially negotiated borders would actually be 
run as intended. Indians, still by far the most formidable power in the trans-Appalachian 
region, could coerce surveying parties to do their bidding, either by physical threat or 
onsite negotiation. On the other hand, surveyors were in a position to secure significant 
personal gains by altering a line's designated course or, at the very least, they could end a 
survey prematurely in order to ensure their personal safety. 
In this chapter, I will begin by outlining how educated whites in the 1760s and 
1770s understood geography and space. Their spatial conceptions were no more 
"ordinary" than those of the Indians explored in Chapter One, and thus an explanation of 
how they saw geographical space is necessary to appreciate why surveyed boundary lines 
were so fundamental to territorial delineation. I will then examine the running of two 
lines, one that bisected the Proclamation Line and another that redrew it much farther 
west. The survey of the latitudinal Mason Dixon Line crossed the Proclamation Line into 
Indian country in 1767 and, despite being the most scientifically advanced survey ever 
conducted in the New World, it provided otherwise subaltern western Indians, namely the 
Delawares, with a rare opportunity to influence borders in their own homeland. In 1771, 
John Donelson surveyed the new Indian Boundary Line in the Virginia backcountry, a 
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remarkable episode in which the surveyor and the Cherokee chief accompanying him 
agreed to reposition the line during the survey itself. These two surveys, the Mason 
Dixon Line and the Donelson Line, demonstrated the power of Indians and surveyors to 
decide the ultimate placement of important colonial boundaries, an onsite fait accompli 
that could override even the most carefully planned borders. 
* * * 
Educated Englishmen and Creoles in the second half of the eighteenth century 
shared a common understanding of how space should by comprehended and delineated 
because these educated gentleman all learned a standardized version of geography. 
Geography, like other European sciences during the mid eighteenth century, was fueled 
by the pursuit of precision through the use of regulated mathematics, measurements, and 
instruments.2 To be sure, few of those whom I am classifying as "officials" were able to 
conduct the precise experiments that proved the axioms of geography. Yet almost all 
British men with pretensions to gentlemanly status would have read one or more of the 
many textbooks meant to instruct "our younger sort of Nobility and Gentry [in] 
MODERN GEOGRAPHY, that most useful science."3 Even those with no interest in 
geography as knowledge were often very interested in land as a profitable resource, and 
2
 Marie-Noelle Bourguet, Christian Licoppe, and H. Otto Sibum, "Introduction," in Instruments, Travel, 
and Science: Itineraries of Precision from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries, edited by Marie-
Noelle Bourguet, Christian Licoppe, and H. Otto Sibum (New York: Routledge, 2002), 8. For an excellent 
work on the impact of the positivist movement of eighteenth century science on geography, see Margarita 
Bowen, Empiricism in Geographical Thought: From Francis Bacon to Alexander von Humboldt (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
3
 Patrick Gordon, Geography anatomiz'd, or, The compleat geographical grammar being a short and exact 
analysis of the whole body of modem geography after a new and curious method / collected from the best 
authors and illustrated with divers maps, London : Printed for Robert Morden and Thomas Cockerill, 1699, 
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would thus aim to know the basics of the science that regulated how the lands they 
coveted were divvied-up. 
There were, of course, varying degrees of geographical proficiency among white 
officials, and those individuals involved in creating the American boundary lines ranged 
from being casually competent to cutting edge experimenters. I will thus first introduce 
European geography (the foundation of official surveying) at its most basic, as non-
specialists would have learned it from the multitude of primers on the subject. I will then 
examine how professional surveyors, the geographic specialists most relevant to this 
chapter, went about dissecting space with boundary lines. 
The spatial conception of educated Britons was based on geography, a science 
that they learned in school and from textbooks.4 One of these texts meant to "render 
[geography] inviting to the sons and daughters of England" (Robert Davidson's 
Geography Epitomised) defined geography as "a description of the terraqueous globe."5 
The challenge of the eighteenth century was to describe this globe with precision, and 
even geography texts written explicitly for youths were very clear that precision could 
only be achieved with standardized technology, measurements, and calculations. These 
textbooks thus instructed their readers on how to identify places and spaces on the 
4
 For some of the several examples of these eighteenth century primers, see: A concise system of 
geography: wherein the first principles of the science are laid down in a plain and easy manner, suited to 
the capacities of youth (London: Devizes, 1774); Laurence Echard, A most compleat compendium of 
geography; general and special; describing all the empires, kingdoms, and dominions in the whole world 
(London, 1705); Daniel Fenning, A new and easy guide to the use of the globes; and the rudiments of 
geography (London, 1760); J. A. Gregory, Manual of modern geography, containing a short, but 
comprehensive and entertaining account of all the known world (London, 1760); John Holmes, The 
grammarian's geography and astronomy ancient and modern, exemplified in the use of the globes 
terraqueous and ccelestial (London, 1751); Johann Hilbner, An introduction to geography, by way of 
question and answer (London, 1738); Joseph Randall, A course of lectures in the most easy, useful, and 
entertaining parts of geography, astronomy, chronology, and pneumatics (London, 1750); The young 
gentleman and lady's geography (Dublin, 1766). 
5
 Robert Davidson, Geography epitomised; or a tour round the world: being a short but comprehensive 
description of the terraqueous globe: attempted in verse,... By an American. [London], 1786. 
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"terraqueous globe" in terms of geometric shapes, especially lines, and the tool these 
primers advocated for learning how to do so was a model globe. A dialogue between a 
geographer and his pupil in Geography Made Familiar and Easy to Young Gentlemen 
and Ladies (1748) illustrated this point: 
Q. Which is the best Way to attain a just idea of the Globe of the Earth? 
A. You will form the truest idea of the Natural Globe by viewing and studying an 
Artificial One. 
Q. What is an Artificial Globe? 
A. It is a round Body, made by Art, on whose surface the outward Parts of the whole 
Earth and Sea are delineated.6 
Other artificial globes were designed so that the earth's surface could be viewed with 
direct reference to the surrounding sphere of fixed stars.7 Herman Moll's An Introduction 
to Geography (1701) described such a sphere as "a round and movable instrument, made 
up of divers circles which the astronomers have invented for... conceiving the motions of 
Q 
the Heavens, and representing the true situation of the Earth." These globes were 
critically important for how territory was understood. The fact that "the true situation" of 
any place could only be known by measuring the earth's position within the celestial 
sphere encouraged officials to visualize the earth on its largest scale—a planet situated in 
space. Thus the earth, which would have seemed impossibly huge if seen only from 
ground level, could now be perceived as a finite and regular shape. 
As a geometric figure, the earth could be divided with mathematical laws into 
smaller regular shapes, thus providing a framework in which standardized geographic 
Geography made familiar and easy to young gentlemen and ladies. Being the sixth volume of the Circle of 
the sciences (London, 1748), 6. 
7
 Geographers were well aware that the sun was the center of the solar system, yet it still made sense for 
terrestrial geography to view the heavens as revolving around a fixed earth. 
8
 Herman Moll, A system of geography: or, a new & accurate description of the earth in all its empires, 
kingdoms and states... (London, 1701), 6. 
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axiom could be averred. Like other aspects of geography, these geometric conceptions 
were most authoritative when explained with reference to the fixed stars. According to 
Moll, the circle is the primary geometric form used to divide a sphere's surface and, in 
the case of the earth, the most recognized circles are those located directly below 
constellations. "The tropicks are two Circles parallel to the Aequator, and equally distant 
from it. One of 'em passing through the beginning of Cancer towards the North, the 
other through the beginning of Capricorn towards the South, and... removed from the 
Aequator on either side.. .23 deg. 31 min."9 
Despite the importance of the tropics as celestial referents, it is significant that 
Moll included their latitude, because latitude and longitude were circles that "are 
absolutely necessary to understanding this science."10 The grid formed by these two sets 
of circles was the basis for creating a series of provable facts that legitimized geography 
as a precise science. In Geography Anatomiz'd (1700), Patrick Gordon lists forty-one 
"chief Geographical theorems, or self-evident Truths" based on latitude and longitude.11 
Both geographical theorems and the artificial globes helped make geography a 
powerful science for Europeans in the early modern period. The proven axioms of 
geography gave those who understood it a sort of global clairvoyance, enabling them to 
know things about distant places and peoples that would have been unknowable to those 
uninitiated in the geographic arts. For example, Gordon demonstrated how one can 
"know by the globe when the Great Mogul of India, and Czar of Moscovia, sit down to 
9
 Ibid., 6. 
10
 Ibid., 6. 
11
 Gordon, Geography Anatomiz'd, 36. 
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Dinner."12 Although this may seem trivial, such notions of planet-wide surveillance did 
much to bolster Europe's sense of international and racial superiority. Geography also 
endowed Europeans with the ability "to know the climate of any given place."14 
Combined with the "science" of environmental determinism, the ability to ascertain a 
region's climate based on its latitude allowed the educated to denigrate the physical and 
mental capacities of various peoples without having to observe them first hand. 
While most educated whites shared this geometrically precise vision of terrestrial 
space, only a small corps of professional surveyors was capable of running boundary 
lines on the actual earth, a skill that made them highly valued in British society. Not only 
were most legal land holdings reliant on the accurate measurements of surveyors, but 
they were the vehicle through which the idealized visions of geographical order could be 
inscribed directly on an otherwise chaotic landscape.15 In 1771, the poet Thomas Sadler 
elegized this power of surveyors to give order to nature: 
The Bounds of Nature finely drawn we see, 
Art forms the line and Genius makes it free,... 
SCIENCE! Thou Daughter of the Skies, 'tis thine, 
To make Perfection in [nature's] Beauties shine;... 
In thy rich stores our lab'ring Thoughts absorb, 
Measure the Earth, and each Celestial Orb. 
All [nature's] Dimensions we with Ease impart, 
By GEODAESIA, and the Rules of Art.16 
12
 Ibid., 17. 
13
 On the importance of surveillance in the European power structure, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
Gordon, Geography Anatomiz 'd, 23. 
15
 For more on the importance and status of surveyors in colonial America, see Sarah S. Hughes, Surveyors 
and Statesmen: Land Measuring in Colonial Virginia (Richmond: The Virginia Surveyors Association, 
1979). 
16
 Thomas Sadler, "To Mr. Arthur Burns, on his New Treatise, intitled Geodaesia Improved: A Poem," in 
Arthur Burns, Geodcesia improved; or, a new and correct method of surveying made exceeding easy. 
(Chester, 1771), iii. 
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Precise science allowed surveyors to delineate the earth's true "dimensions," which, for 
them, were geometric shapes based on the lines drawn "By GEODAESIA." 
Mathematics and instruments regulated the practice of land surveying, the "useful 
art" for which precision was most often and most publicly disputed—and thus most 
necessary.17 After all, both land holders and their tenants relied on accurate surveys to 
ensure that each party had its proper due.18 Furthermore, states and their provinces were 
sometimes divided by unnatural linear boundaries, a circumstance that, as in the case of 
the Mason Dixon Line, prompted much conflict over lines' true location. Considering 
the potential of surveying to impact the lives of real people and governments, precision 
measuring was perhaps more important for this science than for any other practiced 
during the eighteenth century. 
For measuring small tracts, chains (especially "Gunter's Chains") worked 
perfectly well,19 but for long boundary lines like those considered in this chapter, it was 
imperative to conduct accurate angle measurements and be familiar with trigonometry. 
In The Art of Surveying (1770), William Emerson listed "those [instruments] for 
measuring angles; as the Theodolite, plain table, semicircle, circumferentor, Geodetical 
17
 Burns, Geodcesia improved, i. 
For more on the role of surveyors in disputes between landlords and tenants, see J.H. Andrews, 
Plantation Acres: An Historical Study of the Irish Land Surveyor and his Maps (Ulster Historical 
Foundation, 1985), 134-136. 
19
 William Emerson argued that "Gunter's Chain is the best for measuring land; its length is 4 poles or 22 
yards; and is divided into 100 links" (William Emerson,. The art of surveying, or measuring land.... 
(London, 1770), 5); Arthur Burns advocated that surveyors should "measure, layout, and divide 
Land...with the Chain only" (Burns, Geodcesia improved, i, ii); historian A.W. Richeson attested to the 
efficacy of Burns' chain-only method, calling Burns' surveying manual "the outstanding surveying text of 
the late eighteenth century." (A.W. Richeson, English Land Measuring to 1800: Instruments and Practices 
(Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), 158). 
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staff, infallible, &c. The angles found with these increasingly precise instruments 
were used to make trigonometric calculations that established the area of a given plot and 
the course of boundary lines. According to Burns' surveying manual, "it is absolutely 
necessary for everyone that would become an Artist in measuring land, to begin with, and 
be very expert in several rules of arithmetic."21 Plane trigonometry was sufficient for the 
vast majority of land surveys, but long boundary lines had to take the curvature of the 
earth into consideration, a far more complex calculation. 
It may seem unlikely that American Indians would have been able to take 
advantage of these precise and high-tech surveys, but that is exactly what happened in the 
trans-Appalachian backcountry during the 1760s and early 1770s. The Indians' own 
geographic technology was limited more or less to the syncretic maps examined in 
chapter one, documents that failed to have the desired effect on official territorial 
boundaries. Maps had to be presented at formal meetings that were usually located on 
the British side of the frontier, a circumstance that made the Indians' preferred borders 
reliant on the approval of colonial officials. The boundaries that were agreed upon and 
mapped out at these treaties, however, had to be precise in order for officials to consider 
them legitimate, and the only way to achieve this was to send professional surveyors to 
the border itself, an area in which Indians were still the central powerbrokers. 
In the eyes of officials used to imagining the earth as a model globe, the running 
of lines on its surface may have seemed like a straightforward issue of geometry. Yet on 
the frontier, this concept of space collided with that of Indian groups who had every 
Emerson, The Art of Surveying, 1. Jeremiah Dixon used an advanced theodolite crafted by English 
instrument maker George Adams to run boundary lines throughout his career as a surveyor. A.R.H. 
"Jeremiah Dixon's Theodolite," in The Geographical Journal, vol. 47, no. 1 (Jan, 1916), 1-3. 
1
 Burns, Geodcesia improved, viii. 
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reason to resent whites and their attitudes towards land ownership. The conflicts that 
ensued onsite during surveys across and of the Indian Boundary Line, and the impromptu 
negotiations that resulted from them, are the subject of the rest of this chapter. 
* * * 
Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon geodetically surveyed a partition to settle the 
long disputed border between Maryland and Pennsylvania. Their line, though, came to 
represent much more in the American consciousness: it is the iconic boundary between 
north and south, a division between race-based slavery and racial freedom. Yet while 
they were surveying the Line (from 1763-1768), the geographical partition that most 
concerned colonials was that between east and west, whites and Indians—two groups 
that, by the 1760s, hated and killed each other throughout the backcountry.22 The 
Proclamation Line of 1763, a north-south boundary on the western frontier, was meant to 
be America's first truly racial division. In the years between the Seven Years' War and 
the American Revolution, it acted as a front across which each side could identify a racial 
enemy, one that they characterized as hostile and inherently different than themselves. 
For the British government, the Proclamation Line was created as part of the 
larger effort to deal with the vast territories recently taken from France in an 
In January of 1765, while on winter holiday from running the Maryland/Pennsylvania boundary, Charles 
Mason visited Lancaster, Pennsylvania where he described in his Journal the Paxton Boys' massacre, the 
most famous episode of violence by Indian haters in the 1760s. "What brought me here was my curiosity to 
see the place where was perpetuated last Winter the Horrid and inhuman murder of 26 Indians, Men, 
Women and Children, leaving none alive to tell." The dead were Conestoga Indians who "had fled to the 
Gaol" in Lancaster in a vain effort to escape the Paxton Boys, vigilantes who hated them because they were 
Indians. The Paxtons broke into the jail and brutally executed and dismembered the Conestogas, peaceful 
dependents on the Pennsylvanian government and erstwhile neighbors of the Paxtons. "Strange it was that 
the Town though as large as most Market Towns in England, never offered to oppose them ... no honor to 
them!" The Paxtons, it seems, were not alone in their sentiments. In Charles Mason, The Journal of 
Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon, transcribed by A. Hughlett Mason (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 1969), 66. 
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economically frugal way.23 Keeping their Indian neighbors happy was one of the most 
important aspects of this policy; thus trans-Appalachian settlement was forbidden in 
hopes that "the Indians may be convinced of our... Resolution to remove all reasonable 
Cause of Discontent."24 The Line, at least in theory, also prevented speculators and 
squatters from inhabiting lands that the British government could no longer afford to 
protect. 
The concept of a royal boundary line also pleased western Indians, especially the 
Delawares, who—as seen in Teedyuscung's negotiations at Easton—had long desired a 
formal line of separation to forestall white encroachments. After the violence, 
negotiations, and frustrations surrounding the Delawares' land claims between 1755 and 
1763, the Royal Proclamation must have seemed like an answer to their prayers. By the 
"Royal Will" the British mapped a line of separation, one far grander in scope and closer 
to their own preferences than anything that the Delawares, still subject to Iroquois 
hegemony, could have hoped to negotiate themselves.25 Not only was the boundary line 
ordered and publicized by map, a geographic technology with which the Delawares were 
quite comfortable, but it also satisfied the traditional Indian spatial concept that territories 
were best separated by natural landmarks. The Proclamation Line ran the length of the 
Appalachian Mountains, the most recognizable north-south division in eastern North 
America. 
For more on the aftermath of the Seven Years War, see Colin G. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 
and the Transformation of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
24
 "The Royal Proclamation- October 7, 1763." By The King, George R. The Avalon Project at Yale Law 
School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/proc 1763 .htm 
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By 1763, influenced by the teachings of Neolin, many Delawares and other 
western Indians saw the entirety of trans-Appalachian America as a racial homeland. By 
officially segregating this territory from the settled colonies, the Proclamation Line did 
much to reinforce this sentiment. Similarly, the Proclamation Line also encouraged 
eastern whites to conceive of the west as Indian country and thus conflate all of the 
previously disparate Indian nations into a single Indian race. The Delawares, in many 
ways, became the archetype for this new Indian enemy. Their violence in 1755-6 
triggered a wave of Indian hating and, as advocates of both pan-Indianism and formal 
separation, they were readily associated with the Ohio country and the anti-British 
sentiment therein.26 For many British colonists in the mid to late 1760s, the Proclamation 
Line allowed traits of savagery, hitherto assigned to the Delawares by frontier settlers, to 
become the standard image of all Indians.27 
More significantly, just as white inhabitants of the Pennsylvania backcountry had 
lived in fear of Delaware attacks, so the colonies as a whole started to fear a general 
Indian war. On December 17, 1767, a New York newspaper warned that "the Indians in 
general on the Continent are daily growing more and more dissatisfied and discontented 
Indian hating was certainly visible in earlier white-Indian conflicts, especially in brutalities like the 1676 
massacre at the Great Swamp Fortress during King Philip's War. The racial hatred that developed on the 
mid-eighteenth century frontier, however, was the beginning of a long and widespread notion that Indians 
were inherently inferior and savage. According to Jane T. Merritt, Indian hating developed on 
Pennsylvania's frontier because whites felt betrayed by Indian groups whom they had long considered 
neighbors and allies, Jane T. Merritt, At The Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 
1700-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 190-197. For more on the rise of 
Indian hating on the Pennsylvania frontier, see Daniel K. Richter, Facing East From Indian Country: A 
Native History of Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 189-236. 
27
 Indian haters, like the Paxton Boys, often justified their atrocities with the language of savagism, a 
characterization that elites had long used to denigrate both Indians and unruly whites before frontiersmen 
re-projected it onto all Indians as a coherent and inherently barbaric race (Merritt, At The Crossroads, 12, 
281-282). 
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among themselves, and that it will probably soon produce a Rupture." Two years later, 
The Providence Gazette and Country Journal claimed that "an Indian war is 
inevitable."29 Such journalism was quite common throughout the 1760s and 
demonstrated the fear of race-based conflict that made the English promote the 
Proclamation Line as a bulwark against a racial enemy. 
The reality, though, was that Indians and whites lived on both sides of the 
boundary, and racial atrocities continued to be a major source of concern for white and 
Indian Americans throughout the 1760s. Strangely, the utter failure of the Proclamation 
Line to stop racial violence, trading abuses, land speculation, and westward expansion 
did nothing to change the opinion of either Indians or whites that a formal separation was 
the key to peaceful coexistence. When, in 1767, "One Stump and his Servant ... in a 
very inhuman manner murdered ten Indians on Susquehanna," George Croghan wrote 
that "It evidently shews the indispensable Necessity of the Indians being removed to a 
greater Distance from our Settlements, and which suffer me to say, can only be done, by 
fixing the Boundary with them. Nothing Else will do." 
The formalization of an enforceable Proclamation Line remained the central issue 
up to and after the Fort Stanwix conference of 1768 which, despite satisfying William 
Johnson's goal of pushing the boundary much further west, also failed to solve the 
2SThe New-York Gazette or The Weekly Post-Boy, December 17, 1767. "New York, December 17, 1767." 
America's Historical Newspapers, 1690-1922. News Bank, http://infoweb.newsbank.com, (my italics). 
29
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problems.31 As with other map-based boundaries of this period (those proposed by 
Indians and whites alike), the Proclamation Line failed to prevent violence and illegal 
territorial encroachment. 
Unlike the Proclamation Line, Mason and Dixon's carefully surveyed border has 
remained an emblematic feature of American geography, one that itself became a site of 
racial tension in the mid nineteenth century. In 1767, however, their Line literally 
crossed racial boundaries when they continued their latitudinal survey west into Indian 
country, bisecting the Proclamation Line that ran along the Appalachian Mountains. 
Their expedition, an officially sanctioned incursion into lands purportedly reserved for 
Indians, attracted the attention of several important figures, both Indian and white, who 
were central to interracial politics. On a smaller scale, the day-to-day experience of the 
survey party illustrated the very real tensions between the British, Iroquois, and 
Delawares. As an occasion that brought racial enemies together, it punctuated the larger 
events and conflicts that forced them to exist separately. 
Near the end of 1766, Mason and Dixon were forced to call a halt to the boundary 
line they had been surveying since 1763; preceding any further would have taken them 
across the Proclamation Line and into Indian country. As official surveyors themselves, 
Mason and Dixon respected the legitimacy of government-made territorial boundaries 
and would have been loathe to transgress one without proper authorization. More 
importantly, officials involved with the survey knew that delineating space west of the 
Proclamation Line would have been a clear insult to Indian sovereignty. The frequency 
of frontier violence and fear of the Delawares made the proprietors of the Line reluctant 
31
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to cross the "Boundary between the Natives and strangers" without the permission of the 
Six Nations.32 Although the part of the Ohio country west of Maryland and Pennsylvania 
was occupied mostly by Delawares and Shawnees, the Iroquois were still recognized as 
the legitimate owners of the Ohio country. Horatio Sharpe, governor of Maryland, thus 
asked Sir William Johnson to "endeavor to prevail on the [Iroquois] Indians to give their 
consent that the [Mason Dixon] line be run" beyond the Appalachians. 
Johnson, however, knew this to be a delicate matter. He was worried that the 
Indians "may be apt to conceive very differently the meaning of the present line," as an 
official encroachment into Indian territory (which, in effect, it was). So on May 8 l , 
1767, Johnson held a conference at the German Flats, New York, to gain the permission 
of the Six Nations to extend Mason and Dixon's survey into Ohio. The Congress was 
attended by many more Iroquois than had been invited, because the Mason Dixon survey 
presented them with an opportunity to learn more about land surveying, knowledge that 
could prove invaluable when running any future boundaries between Iroquoia and the 
British colonies.35 
Johnson, though, was caught up in the omnipresent English fear of a general 
Indian war.36 He confided to Lord Shelburne that he called the Congress only partially 
Mason, The Journal of Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon, 129. 
33
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because it was "a necessary part of [his] duty for terminating these disputes" between 
Maryland and Pennsylvania. The "more material motive [was] satisfying them on the 
Subject of their Inquietudes of which I had the most... alarming accots, and therefore no 
Time was to be lost."37 Still in its planning stages, the western expedition of the Mason 
Dixon Line was already tangled up with the pervading politics and fear surrounding the 
Proclamation Line. 
The proprietors of the Mason Dixon Line provided Johnson and the Iroquois with 
yet another opportunity to direct colonial expansion into Delaware lands.38 The 
superintendent thus chose two important representatives, Hugh Crawford and the 
Mohawk chief Hendrick, to lead the surveyors' expedition into the West. Mason 
described Hugh Crawford as "our Interpreter, who has traversed these parts for 28 years, 
either as an Indian Trader or Commander in his Majesty's Service in the late wars."39 He 
had since served in Johnson's department of Indian affairs as chief assistant to George 
Croghan and acted as liaison to Pontiac in 1766.40 Furthermore, Crawford and Johnson 
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were both active land speculators who hoped to acquire trans-Appalachian territories for 
themselves. As a member of the Ohio Company and one of the Suffering Traders, 
Crawford no doubt hoped to use his place with Mason and Dixon to scout out and secure 
some of the best western lands for himself and his associates.42 
The Iroquois guides were also handpicked for this important excursion. "Sir 
William thought [it] proper to send these Indians down [to the Pennsylvania/Maryland 
border], among whom are the famous Hendrick, and some other principle Headmen of 
the Mohawks Nation."43 Hendrick was a central Mohawk figure in the post Seven Years' 
War era, involved with Johnson and land sales in the 1760s and a primary representative 
of the lower Mohawks at the Fort Stanwix Treaty.44 
Hendrick and the other Iroquois guides (ten other Mohawks and three 
Onondagas)45 had goals of their own that went beyond those of either Johnson or the 
41
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commissioners of the Line. They hoped to learn something about how surveys were 
actually conducted so that they could avoid being cheated when the time came to 
demarcate the revised Proclamation Line. At Fort Stanwix, Johnson confirmed that 
"Indians [would be] appointed to see the line run," and it is more than likely that, given 
the experience and knowledge acquired from the Mason Dixon survey, Hendrick would 
be among these officials.46 In light of Johnson's corruption at Fort Stanwix, familiarity 
with surveying could prove a crucial skill. Considering how Johnson manipulated the 
Proclamation Line's location on maps, the chances were high that he would try to 
increase his own territory during the survey as well. 
The Mason Dixon Line was a prime chance for the Iroquois to glean enough 
knowledge to ensure their agency in future surveys because it was the most scientifically 
advanced surveying project ever attempted in North America and the largest in scope. 
According to Astronomer Royal Nevil Maskelyne, "Messieurs Charles Mason and 
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Jeremiah Dixon [had been engaged] to settle the limits between the provinces of 
Maryland and Pennsylvania, in North America; which the performed partly by 
trigonometry and, and partly by astronomical observations."49 The survey was a 
paradigm of precision; it produced "the straightest and most regular" lines ever run by 
taking astronomical sightings with a new kind of zenith sector, an instrument "so exact 
that they found they could trace out a parallel of latitude by it, without erring above 
fifteen to twenty yards."50 In addition, Mason and Dixon used the boundary survey as an 
opportunity to conduct highly sophisticated experiments for the Royal Society, most 
notably measuring the length of a degree of latitude. To ensure precision, measurements 
were conducted "two or three times" with both brass and fir rods whose minute variations 
were checked against "the height of the thermometer at the time."'1 
No other colonial surveys, including those of the Indian Boundary Line conducted 
in the early 1770s, came close to Mason and Dixon's degree of exactitude, nor were any 
carried out with such a large and well equipped party. Charles Mason's journal is 
frustratingly sparse with details (except those relating to geodetic measurements, which 
are very thorough) and he neglected to include specifics about the number of men (or 
women) in the 1767 expedition and ignored logistical considerations. He did, however, 
sketch the composition of the surveying party in June of 1764. Mason's offhand entry 
noted that "[We] engaged ax men, etc. The whole company including Steward, Tent 
49
 Nevil Maskelyne, "Introduction to the following Observations, made by Messieurs Charles Mason and 
Jeremiah Dixon...," in Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon, "Observations for Determining the Length of a 
Degree of Latitude in the Provinces of Maryland and Pennsylvania, in North America," in Philosophical 
Transactions (1683-1775), vol. 58 (1768), 270. 
50
 Ibid., 271. Their zenith sector, which used a new style of plumb line to ensure accuracy, was developed 
by "master technician" John Bird (Richeson, English Land Measuring to 1800, 163). 
51
 Ibid., 275, 272. 
65 
keepers, Cooks, Chain carriers, etc. amounting to 39. Two Waggons, Eight Horses, 
etc."52 Assuming that the surveying party in 1767 was at least as large as that of 1764 
(and probably much larger), we get some sense of the team that penetrated and delineated 
the Indian Country. The addition of Hendrick and the other Iroquois guides would have 
made this seem a large and threatening force to Delawares and other Indians living in the 
Line's path. 
Observing and assisting the precise measurements of this large surveying party 
would have left the Iroquois guides with enough knowledge of how the English measured 
land to play a decisive role in the running of future boundary lines. This is not to say that 
Hendrick could have measured and run a latitudinal line with the same accuracy as 
Charles Mason, but the Iroquois would have learned which instruments and procedures 
were central to making lines. These could then be the targets of efforts to disrupt or 
manipulate officially surveyed borders. 
Horatio Sharpe and Maryland's other delegates for the Line were well aware of 
the status of these Iroquois guides and the importance of ensuring they were treated with 
the necessary respect. Sharpe went so far as to declare that "the public Peace ... may 
greatly depend on the good Usage and kind Treatment of these Deputies."53 He feared 
that mistreating these important chiefs, especially whilst in officially recognized Indian 
country, could explode into the widely dreaded Indian war. 
Mason and Dixon were thus enjoined "Not only to use them well yourselves but 
to be careful that they receive no Abuse or ill treatment from the Men you may employ in 
52
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carrying on the said Work, and to do your utmost to protect them from the Insults of all 
other persons whatsoever."54 Also in the interest of ensuring peaceful relations, Sharpe 
included an addendum to this letter which advised that the Indian guides be given 
(diluted) liquor no more than three times a day.55 He knew how high tensions had 
become between Indians and whites and hoped to make certain that a war would not start 
on account of a drunken quarrel between an Iroquois chief and a white frontiersman. 
Far more threatening than these potential internal conflicts were the very real 
dangers of surveying in Indian country, an activity with which the Delawares in particular 
took umbrage. The survey's axmen could surely recall how in 1755 Delaware warriors 
had murdered fourteen settlers near Perm's Creek with chains and axes (iconic tools of 
white surveys), symbolically reclaiming their stolen land on the bodies of their victims.56 
White fear of Indian violence was a powerful force east of the Proclamation Line, but it 
was truly terrifying in the West. Upon reaching the Monongahela River, about fifty miles 
into Indian country, twenty-six (over half) of Mason and Dixon's axmen turned back 
east, "they would not pass the river for fear of the Shawanes and Delawares Indians."57 
The Mohawks also knew that they were in dangerous territory. Twenty-six miles 
and one month before the axmen quit, Mason noted that "Mr. John Green, one of the 
Chiefs of the Mohawks Nation, and his Nephew left us, in order to return to his own 
Country."58 Despite Iroquois claims to control Ohio and the Indians who lived there, 
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John Green made it clear that they did not really believe it to be their "own Country." It 
is therefore no surprise that the guides were "very glad to see" a band of Seneca warriors 
en route to war with the Cherokees.59 It made them feel more secure to know that more 
armed Iroquois were near at hand. 
The territory west of the Maryland/Pennsylvania border was controlled by the 
Delawares and Shawnees, and the Iroquois' claim to rule them and their land quickly 
proved illusionary. The Delawares, still struggling in 1767 between the Scylla and 
Charybdis of the Six Nations and the English, were well aware of the Iroquois led 
expedition of Imperial surveyors delineating their land without their permission. 
Like Johnson and the Iroquois, the Delawares also sent an elite representative to 
meet with the surveying party: "Prince Prisqueetom, Brother to the King of the 
Delawares."60 It seems certain that Prisqueetom was the same man as Pisquetomen, the 
elder brother of such famous frontier figures as Shingas, Delaware George, and 
Tamaqua—"King Beaver" of the Western Delawares. According to Michael N. 
McConnell, Pisquetomen and Tamaqua were arbiters for peace with the English, using 
diplomacy to ensure that the Western Delawares remained secure in their Ohio homeland. 
After 1755, Pisquetomen "began the most active moment of his public life, serving as 
both his brother's eyes and ears and as a link between the Delawares' peace faction and 
the British." McConnell, however, wrote "it seems likely" that Pisquetomen died in 
59
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1762, "robbing Tamaqua and his people of decades of experience in coping with the 
colonial world." 
Not only was Pisquetomen still very much alive in 1767, but he remained active 
in his old role as Tamaqua's eyes and ears among the British. His primary goal in 
meeting with Mason and Dixon was probably to inspect the surveying party and keep a 
close watch on it as it proceeded westward. As an official British expedition led by 
Iroquois Indians and a representative of William Johnson, the survey must have been 
perceived as an immediate threat to the Delawares' lands in Ohio, territory that they 
continued to hope would be protected by the Proclamation Line. For Pisquetomen, who 
in his youth was a translator during the Walking Purchase of 1737, Mason and Dixon's 
survey had an ominous precedent. Since much of the Walk's fraud occurred during its 
survey, when "the young Proprietaries came and got [the boundary] run by a straight 
Course by the Compass, and by that Means took in double the Quantity intended to be 
sold," Pisquetomen would have considered it imperative to keep Mason and Dixon under 
close surveillance.63 
Yet Pisquetomen was also a high-profile cultural intermediary, and that Tamaqua 
sent such an important and aged dignitary to meet with Mason and Dixon evinces that he 
understood the unique opportunities that trans-Appalachian surveys offered Indian groups 
like the Delawares. As officials who were required to go into the Delawares' country for 
the sake of onsite precision, Mason and Dixon presented the Delawares with a rare 
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chance to negotiate borders away from the Iroquois dominated treaty system. The fact 
that Mason and Dixon were surveyors, the people who actually made the official 
boundary lines that the Delawares so desired, made it all the more important for the 
Delawares to settle with them directly. 
Pisquetomen's message was still one of peace: in good English, the "old Prince" 
told the surveyors how he and his brother "had a great mind to go and see the great King 
over the Waters; and make a perpetual Peace with him."64 Just as meeting with the 
surveyors gave Pisquetomen the chance to act independently of the Iroquois, so too did 
his wish to treat directly with the English King demonstrate that the Delawares knew the 
colonial treaty system offered them little hope of achieving sovereignty. Such aspirations 
must have chafed Hendrick and the other the Mohawks present, who still insisted that the 
Delawares were women incapable of diplomatic relations without their supervision. 
Nevertheless, Pisquetomen made it clear that the Delawares also still distrusted the 
English; he would not travel to England to meet with the king because "he was afraid he 
should not be sent back to his own Country."65 
Upon reaching a Delaware warpath at Dunchard Creek two hundred and thirty-
three miles west of the Line's eastern origin, Hendrick told Mason and Dixon that they 
had reached the "extent of his commission from the Chiefs of the Six Nations ... and that 
he would not proceed one step further westward."66 The warpath was, to use Nancy 




Shoemaker's terminology, both an explicit and an implicit national boundary. It 
marked explicitly a geopolitical boundary of the Delawares' sovereign territory, one that 
the Iroquois guides refused to violate despite their boasts to own that land. The warpath 
on Dunchard's Creek was an implicit national boundary because it tied the national 
history of the Delawares to that territory. Mason noted in his journal that "This Creek 
takes its name from a small town settled by the Dunchards...the Town was burnt and 
most of the inhabitant killed by the Indians in 1755."68 Although the landmark's name 
was of European origin, the significance of the warpath evoked the Delawares' national 
sovereignty and reinforced their claims to the land. 
Mason, Dixon, and Crawford could not prevail upon the Iroquois guides to 
change their minds, so the entire expedition began its journey back east (with Mason and 
Dixon rechecking their measurements all the way). The Line was supposed to continue 
until it reached the fifth degree of longitude west of the Delaware River, about eighty 
miles west of the Proclamation Line and thirty miles beyond where the Iroquois stopped 
the expedition. 
The surveyors and officials involved in the Line were surprised to hear of its 
premature conclusion. There had been no mention of a prearranged terminus and all 
evidence indicates that the Iroquois guides were paid and treated well during the survey. 
Contemporary newspapers simply claimed that the guides turned back on account of the 
winter, while Johnson accounted for their reversal as a reaction to the "universal 
67
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discontent prevailing among them" about frontier atrocities and the failure to survey and 
enforce the Proclamation Line.70 
Hendrick, though, decided to turn back only after reaching the Delaware warpath 
at Dunchard Creek, a mark on the landscape that sent a clear message to the Iroquois 
guides that the lands further west were outside of their jurisdiction.71 For the Iroquois, 
the warpath was a visible reminder that the Delawares, despite their label as women, were 
more than capable of annihilating the small party of Iroquois and English trespassing on 
land they increasingly considered to be their racial home. 
Hendrick and the other Iroquois (and, most likely, the surveyors themselves) were 
afraid to proceed into Delaware country, where they knew their purported authority 
would not protect them from people who had every reason to resent them and the survey 
they accompanied. Despite all of the advanced instruments and formal geographic 
conventions that Mason and Dixon employed, their survey ultimately relied on Indian 
conceptions of space. Both the Iroquois recognition of the territorial boundary implicit in 
the warpath and the Delawares notion that the west was their racial homeland prevented 
the survey from being completed. 
The early end of the Mason Dixon Line must be counted as a Delaware victory 
because, as things stood in 1767, the extension of an official colonial boundary eighty 
miles beyond the supposedly sacrosanct Proclamation Line would have meant the end of 
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any pretensions the Delawares had towards territorial sovereignty. Their warpath had 
made their boundaries clear to the Iroquois guides while also evincing their military 
potential. Furthermore, by sending Pisquetomen to meet with Mason and Dixon, the 
Delawares showed that they—not eastern officials or the Iroquois—were the group with 
whom any onsite land claims ultimately had to be reckoned. 
The spatial conception of white officials that required authoritative boundaries to 
be run onsite left the Line vulnerable to adjustment or, in this case, termination, by 
Indian groups whose own notions of how space was delineated and the rights by which it 
could be claimed often proved decisive. If officials had considered it sufficiently precise 
to draw the boundary line on a map, then the western Indians would have been denied 
any agency in deciding its position. Unfortunately for the Delawares and other western 
nations, the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768 would do just that. 
By redrawing the course of the Indian Boundary Line on a map, William Johnson 
was able to dictate the position of borders in a way that would have been far more 
difficult if done on site. Not that this mapped-line was any more successful in controlling 
white expansion or stopping frontier violence than previous ones had been, but it did 
prevent western Indians from citing the Royal Proclamation Line of 1763 as a legitimate 
and recognized territorial border. 
The very impermanence of the mapped Indian Boundary Line stands in stark 
contrast to the surveyed Mason Dixon Line, a latitudinal border that remains a well-
recognized mark on the American landscape (albeit because of its significance as the 
boundary between slavery and freedom in the nineteenth century). Of course, not all 
surveyed boundary lines have had the staying power of Mason's and Dixon's. 
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Donelson's Line of 1771, a surveyed boundary between Virginia and Cherokee country is 
no longer on any map of the United States, but it demonstrated just how influential 
Indians and surveyors could be when, for precision's sake, lines had to be run onsite in 
the west. 
* * * 
By the late 1760s, it was all too apparent that the Proclamation Line of 1763 was 
doing more to aggravate existing frontier tensions than to solve them. Yet both Indians 
and whites, groups who increasingly considered each other racial enemies, continued to 
press for the formalization of an Indian Boundary Line that could keep each race safe 
from the other. It was decided that the Line should be moved westward and the 
superintendents of Indian affairs, John Stuart and Sir William Johnson, should negotiate 
the new boundary with the powerful Indian groups in their region. In 1768, Stuart and 
the Cherokees resettled the border between Virginia and Cherokee country at Hard Labor 
and Johnson met with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix shortly thereafter. 
At the Treaty of Hard Labor, Stuart and the Cherokees agreed to change the 
Indian Boundary Line from the Appalachian Mountains to one that ran "in a straight line 
about a north course to the confluence of the Great Conhoway [Kanawha] with the 
Ohio."" This new boundary opened up the area east of the Ohio River for settlement 
N.B. Many of the most relevant documents relating to this section can only be found in the archives of 
the Colonial Office in London. As I have been unable to travel to London for this thesis, I must rely on 
extended quotes from these documents found in published secondary sources. I was, however, able to 
confirm the accuracy of several of these quotes by checking their wording with other published 
transcriptions of the same documents. This is not ideal, but it is the best I can do for now. 
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(including the land that Mason and Dixon had been prevented from surveying the 
previous year) and was meant to meet up with the northern border being established by 
Johnson. As with the original Proclamation Line, Indian groups hoped that this boundary 
could safeguard their territorial claims as well as ensure that racial segregation was the 
rule along the frontier. At the conclusion of the treaty, the Cherokee chief Oconostata 
expressed his peoples' desire that the Hard Labor Line would finally provide spatial and 
racial separation: "the Land is now divided for the use of the red and white people and I 
hope the white inhabitants of the frontiers will pay great attention to the line Marked and 
agreed upon."74 By putting his territorial speech in terms of red and white, Oconostata 
made it clear that race and land had become overlapping issues in the backcountry. 
The problem, however, was that the line was never "Marked." Stuart knew that 
surveying the boundary as soon as possible was integral to ensuring its legitimacy, but he 
was forced to postpone the survey because of delays to the Fort Stanwix Treaty. When 
Fort Stanwix was finally concluded, it became clear that Johnson, against the instruction 
of Whitehall, had used this treaty to acquire vast amounts of land for speculators 
(including himself) and, by so doing, created a boundary that was too far west to meet up 
with the Hard Labor Line. 
The two Virginians designated to survey the Hard Labor Line, Dr. Thomas 
Walker and Andrew Lewis, were also Virginia's representatives at Fort Stanwix. They 
were each prominent speculators who claimed large tracts beyond the Hard Labor Line 
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and, like most Virginians, resented the limits that Great Britain placed on expansion. 
At Fort Stanwix, Walker and Lewis agreed to recognize the Six Nations' claim to (and 
thus right to sell) the Ohio Valley, but in so doing forfeited all of Virginia's claims to this 
region. Although this upset many Virginian expansionists, the lands they most coveted 
were in the southwest (present day Kentucky) and they realized that the inconsistencies 
between the Hard Labor and Stanwix Lines presented them with a chance to acquire more 
western land.77 
The House of Burgesses led the effort to convince John Stuart to push Virginia's 
boundary even further west than the line he renegotiated following Fort Stanwix. In a 
1769 letter, the Burgesses cited several reasons "in favor of a more extended Boundary 
westward," one far more ambitious than the compromise reached by Stuart and the 
Cherokees earlier that year. 
[We] beg leave to observe that [Stuart's] Line...would be two hundred miles in 
length, and must pass through a Country abounding with high and rugged Mountains 
[and] that the present posture of Indian Affairs would make a strong guard of armed 
men necessary for the protection of those who might be commissioned to run the 
line, as it must pass through a Country uninhabited, and through which those Indians 
7Q 
who seem at present most inclined to hostilities, do frequently take their routes. 
The Burgesses, it seems, had learned a lesson from the Mason and Dixon survey, when 
onsite Indian interference had left Virginia's northern boundary with Pennsylvania 
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incomplete. They also echoed the notion that total separation with a racial boundary line 
was necessary in order to protect whites from savage Indians. Stuart's proposed line 
would make the many Virginians who had already settled illegally in Indian country 
vulnerable to "Indians and others, enemies to His Majesty...whereby the settlers...will, 
in all probability, be utterly destroyed."80 
Stuart, the authority on Indian affairs, was "mortified [that his] reasoning on the 
subject of a more extended Boundary must differ from that of...the House of 
Burgesses."81 Significantly, Stuart justified his placement of the line with a similar 
argument as the Burgesses, that Indians were a united racial threat. According to Stuart, 
the boundary proposed by the Burgesses would cause conflict "immediately with the 
Cherokees and Chickasaws, but [also] the jealousies and apprehensions of every tribe on 
the continent.. .would be again revived." He went on to emphasize that the Burgesses' 
line "would be productive of a general rupture with, and coalitions of, all the Tribes on 
the Continent."83 
Such fear of a united enemy was the result of the Proclamation Line of 1763, a 
boundary that, by virtue of a shared geographic space, led whites to see all Indians as a 
single race, not several nations. The traits of vilified Indian groups, especially the 
Delawares, were conflated to encompass all Indians, instigating fears that small frontier 
raids, like those of 1755 or 1763, would be writ large. Ironically, this fear prompted 
eastern whites to continue to press for an evermore western boundary line as a bulwark 
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against this threat, an initiative that only served to prompt Indians to form the very 
coalitions that whites so feared. 
Stuart thus reproved the Burgesses desired line by claiming "an encroachment on 
the lands of any nation becomes a common cause, and attracts the attention of the 
whole," and that, more immediately, "deputies from the Shawanese [and] Delawares [are] 
endeavoring to form a general confederacy on the purpose of defending their lands." 
Invoking the specter of a Delaware-led coalition of hostile Indians was his final argument 
against the Burgesses, and proved influential enough that they accepted the line Stuart 
had originally proposed and even provided £2500 for the planned treaty at Lochaber that 
would make that boundary official—at least on paper. 
Elite whites, of course, were not the only group who considered the Indian 
Boundary Line as protection against inherently wicked enemies. While negotiating the 
line that would become formalized at Lochaber, the Cherokee leader Oconostata told 
Stuart "we want to keep the Virginians at as great a distance as possible, as they are 
generally bad men and love to steal horses and hunt for deer."85 The inclination to speak 
"generally" of whites reflected both the nativism promulgated in Indian country by men 
like Neolin as well as the sense of racial separateness reinforced by the Indian Boundary 
Line itself. 
Although the Virginian surveyors Walker and Lewis were originally designated to 
run the remapped line, Stuart and the Burgesses agreed to replace them with John 
Donelson. Walker and Lewis' western land claims made Stuart suspicious of their 
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motives, and many influential Virginians (themselves speculators associated with the 
Ohio Company) distrusted the surveyors' ties to the Greenbrier and Loyal land 
companies.86 Yet Donelson also had much to gain from this appointment. He would be 
in a position to scout out and delineate the best western lands for himself while increasing 
the size of Virginia in order to augment his prestige and bolster his public career. In 
more dramatic fashion than he could have imagined, that is precisely what he did. As 
historian Sarah Hughes succinctly put it, "few men rendered more help to the Virginia 
expansionists and speculators than the Halifax County surveyor, John Donelson." 
Donelson, Stuart, Stuart's deputy Alexander Cameron, Attakullakulla (known to 
the English as Little Carpenter), and "1000 other Indians" agreed to a new boundary of 
separation at the Treaty of Lochaber, October 18,1770. They decided on 
A Line beginning where the Boundary Line between the province of North Carolina 
and the Cherokee Hunting Grounds terminates, and running thence in a West Course 
to a point six mile East of Long Island on Holsten's River, and thence to said river 
six miles above Long Island, and then in a direct course to the confluence of the 
Great Conhanoy and Ohio Rivers.88 
The treaty even explicitly stated the underlying motive of the boundary line: racial 
separation. It thus included a clause that "His Majesty's white subjects...shall not, upon 
any pretense whatsoever settle beyond the said Line, nor shall the said Indians make any 
settlements or encroachments" to the east.89 
The treaty's stipulations regarding "Long Island on Holsten's River" would prove 
to be a decisive factor in the ultimate location of the surveyed border. The Cherokees 
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were unwilling to cede this island or the land near it because they feared the English 
would use it as a beachhead for the invasion of Cherokee country. Yet "the Indians 
offered, by way of compensation for the land they refused to grant, to run the Line a more 
western course to the Ohio."90 This proposed cession was massive, including almost 
10,000,000 acres of Kentucky. Stuart, however, was renowned for following Whitehall's 
orders to the letter and thus "declined accepting it, not being within the limits of [his] 
instructions."91 Governor Botetourt, along with most other Virginians, was annoyed that 
"the superintendent thought himself so restricted by his orders that he declined accepting 
[the land]...it is a pity that this addition to His Majesty's territory, which is so easy to be 
obtained, should be refused."92 
Yet just because the Lochaber Line was settled by treaty (and, soon after, 
approved by Whitehall) did not mean that the surveyed border would exactly trace, or 
even resemble, the one mapped out at Lochaber. Indeed, the treaty's final stipulation, 
that "no alteration whatsoever shall henceforth be made in the Boundary Line [except] 
with the consent of the Superintendent," would prove to be as ephemeral as the Lochaber 
Line itself.93 
On May 26, 1771, about seven months after the ratification of the treaty of 
Lochaber, a surveying party consisting of John Donelson, Alexander Cameron, two 
90
 Stuart to Hillsborough, Colonial Office, 5-72, found in John Richard Alden, John Stuart and the 
Southern Colonial Frontier: A Study of Indian Relations, War, Trade, and Land Problems in the Southern 
Wilderness, 1754-1775 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1944), 280. 
91
 Ibid., 280. 
92
 Colonial Office, 5-1349, pp. 17, found in De Vorsey, Jr., The Indian Boundary in the Southern Colonies, 
77. 
93
 Treaty of Lochaber, 18 October 1770, in Kennedy, ed., Journals of the House of Burgesses, xvi. 
80 
interpreters, Attakullakulla, and several other Cherokees met near the North Carolina 
border and began to run the line.94 Over the next five months, these men used compasses 
and "poles" for accuracy (not advanced astronomical methods like Mason and Dixon) 
while blazing a line of trees that would serve as both a visible partition between two races 
as well as a precise onsite measurement on which to base globes and maps. The line they 
drew, though, was not the one agreed upon at Lochaber. 
The so-called Donelson Line was an onsite compromise between Donelson and 
Attakullakulla, both in terms of the actual placement of the boundary and the two men's 
differing spatial conceptions. Shortly after the survey began, Donelson and 
Attakullakulla agreed to move the line westward to the Kentucky River, the location that 
Attakullakulla had suggested during the treaty. In the notes of his map of the line, 
Donelson described its surveyed course as 
Beginning at the Steep Rock on the Waters of the great Canaway River, to...the 
[North Carolina] Colony Line & thence Extending the Same in its due West 
Direction—24 Vi miles and 50 poles...To several markt trees on the South fork of 
Holston's River.. .thence to a point 6 miles above the Long Island The[nce] N5°W 4 
3/i miles to a Red Oak markt on the top of a Ridge...Thence N33°W 15 XA miles 
crossing Cumberland Mountain to 3 Sycamore Trees Issuing from one root and 
several other markt trees on a Creek of Louisa River and Thence down the same . ..to 
its confluence with the Ohio.95 
This written sketch illustrates how Donelson's Line constituted a compromise between 
white and Indian methods of delineating space. Prominent features on the landscape, like 
the "Steep Rock" and "3 Sycamore Trees Issuing from one root" embody the kind of 
natural landmarks that were central to Indian maps and mental itineraries since the pre-
94
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contact period (see chapter one) and were essential to Europeans' sense of space as 
well.96 The Line's other basis was the neat units of European geography, measurements 
in degrees, miles, and rods that provided the necessary level of precision to make the 
boundary legitimate in the eyes of English officials. Marking trees was a manner of 
creating artificial landmarks that was common to both cultural traditions. 
According to Donelson, it was Attakullakulla who first suggested changing the 
course of the survey. Donelson presented the Virginia legislature with an affidavit to 
exculpate himself from any charges of malpractice, claiming 
That in the progress of the work, they came to the head of the Louisa, now Kentucky 
River, when the Little Carpenter (a Cherokee Chief,) observed, that his nation 
delighted in having their lands marked out by natural boundaries; and proposed that, 
instead of the Line agreed upon at Lochaber...it should break off at the head of the 
Louisa River, and run thence to the mouth thereof.97 
Although "natural boundaries" were undoubtedly an important aspect of Indian spatial 
systems, it seems suspect that the Cherokees would actually sacrifice 10,000,000 acres of 
their territory just to have natural landmarks. 
What, then, were Attakullakulla's motives for altering the Line and depriving his 
people of a massive territory? The preference for natural boundaries should account for 
part of this, as should the £500 that Donelson promised (though never paid) 
Attakullakulla when they made the onsite deal.98 Historian Louis De Vorsey Jr. posited 
several plausible reasons why Attakullakulla may have wanted a more westerly line. 
Along with natural boundaries and personal enrichment, Attakullakulla could have 
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favored a western boundary because it gave a larger buffer zone for white expansion, 
used white settlers as a defensive wall against hostile northern Indian groups, or gave the 
Cherokees an opportunity to profit from the sale of territory near the Ohio River, lands 
they could only tenuously claim anyway." All of these reasons are credible and, more 
than likely, Attakullakulla had more than one of them in mind when he agreed to 
Donelson's Line. 
After the conclusion of the survey, Attakullakulla voiced his own explanation as 
to why "we have altered the course a little."100 Although this speech was recorded by 
Donelson and thus necessarily dubious, its message appears to be authentic because 
Attakullakulla's rationale reflected the difficult political and geographical position of the 
Cherokees. He claimed that "I have given away some land.. .as my [white] brothers were 
settled upon it and I pitied them."101 Although he may indeed have pitied the settlers 
(they did often lead very difficult lives), it is more likely that Attakullakulla wanted to 
show his "father," John Stuart, that the Cherokees wanted peace with the whites and did 
not intend to wage the Indian war that Stuart and other whites so greatly feared. It is also 
quite possible that Attakullakulla moved the line to accommodate white settlers because 
the very point of the Line was to separate whites and Indians. Attacking whites settled on 
the Indian side of the border would have brought repercussions from the British or 
frontiersmen, so it would have been a pragmatic measure to make sure all established 
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settlers lived east of the boundary (while hoping against hope that the new line would be 
enough to keep them there). 
Regardless of Attakullakulla's precise motive, he would have been unable to 
realize the altered course without the consent of Donelson, the appointed surveyor. As 
most of Donelson's reasons for agreeing to the shift involved personal gain, he would 
have been quick to aver the Cherokee chiefs agency in the decision. He did indeed gain 
much for himself (in addition to the praise of Virginia's elite) by opening a vast new 
region to speculation. He was made Pittsylvania County surveyor, where he demarcated 
4,749 acres of choice land for himself that he later sold for the princely sum of £4,000. 
In 1780, he used his wealth and celebrity status to lead an expedition into present-day 
Tennessee and became a prominent figure in that rapidly whitening region. 
Lord Dunmore, governor of Virginia, hesitated almost an entire year before 
reporting to Hillsborough that "this line is not exactly run by the instructions sent by your 
lordship to Mr. Stuart..., but that it takes in a larger tract of country than by those 
instructions they had permission to include."104 Indeed, he was wise to do so. 
Hillsborough was furious that his orders had been ignored, but it is indicative of the 
power of surveyed boundary lines that he was unable to do anything about it. 
Hillsborough could and did force William Johnson to return much of the land that he took 
illegally from the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix because that transaction was based on a 
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mapped line that had not yet been run onsite. Donelson's Line, however, was a fait 
accompli, a boundary formed outside of the English sphere of influence and thus beyond 
their power to rescind. 
During both the Donelson and Mason and Dixon surveys, Indians took advantage 
of the fact that the conception of geographical space shared by British officials required 
onsite surveys in order in ensure precise, and thus legitimate, boundaries. The 
governmental elites who had decided the hypothetical boundaries could not be present to 
ensure their accuracy and Indians became the primary powerbrokers in shaping 
backcountry boundary lines. 
Indian maps and official surveys, the formal boundary-making sciences examined 
in chapters one and two, both depended to a great extent on the approval of the other 
group. Thus Indian-made maps had to be approved at official treaties and official 
surveys could be stopped or altered by Indians in the west. At this same time, however, 
hordes of uneducated whites were flocking to the backcountry and establishing territorial 
claims that had little regard for Indians, officials, or their carefully surveyed boundaries. 
In fact, as seen in chapter three, it was the very informality of settlers' land claiming 
methods that allowed them to overrun the frontier so efficiently. Unfortunately for 
western Indians, white officials recognized the advantages of settlers' extra-legal land 
claiming methods and the informal (and often brutal) aspects of the settler land ethic 
would become integral to how officials delineated western lands. 
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CHAPTER III 
"BUT FOR THE INJURIES OF ONE MAN": MICHAEL CRESAP AND THE 
PROMULGATION OF THE SETTLER LAND ETHIC IN THE LATE COLONIAL 
ERA1 
Frontier settlers, a population consisting largely of poor and uneducated families, 
were the group most successful in establishing themselves and their cultural spatial 
conceptions in the North American backcountry during the final years of the colonial 
period. Settlers on the whole paid little or no heed to formally mapped boundaries, and 
even those inscribed on the landscape by official surveys were often disregarded if the 
surveyed land was not actually occupied. It was the efficient, extralegal, and decidedly 
imprecise ways that settlers claimed space that made them such a dynamic force on the 
frontier. 
Their ad hoc settlements and general unruliness made settlers a constant source of 
trouble for both Indians and British officials, two groups that had worked to establish 
racial separation through treaties and formal boundaries, both mapped and surveyed. Not 
only were many settlers active Indian haters who robbed and killed Indians, but they did 
so in Indian country, land that Indians considered theirs by political, racial, and divine 
right. Although individual settler homesteads provided Indians with visible and relatively 
' This quote is from a speech by the Cayuga chief Logan in which he lamented the Indian murders 
committed by Michael Cresap in 1774; "The Speech of Logan, a Shawanese Chief to Lord Dunmore," in 
The New-York Gazette; and the Weekly Mercury, February 20, 1775 (me article mistakenly referred to 
Logan as Shawnee). 
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easy targets for violently reclaiming their lands, the sheer number of settlers was quickly 
proving overwhelming and Indians appealed to the colonial and British governments for 
succor. Indeed, authorities were usually glad to assist Indians in evicting settlers from 
Indian country. Not only did settlers occupy lands that wealthier whites coveted (thus 
precluding the payment of rent or deference), but officials feared that the disruptive 
behavior of backwoodsmen would provoke the general Indian war that they so feared in 
the 1760s and early 1770s. 
As a cultural group, settlers have been widely studied, yet it has been an enduring 
problem with this historiography that settlers are usually portrayed as a personality-less 
force of nature, an inevitable wave of whiteness and the independence spirit that simply 
happened without any actual human agency. This attitude can be traced back to the late 
nineteenth century, most notably in Frederick Jackson Turner's 1893 "frontier thesis" and 
Theodore Roosevelt's The Winning of the West. Although settlers did indeed share 
many general traits, especially in their attitudes toward land, it is as necessary to find 
individual agency for this large and diverse group as it is when studying Indians or white 
officials. Focusing on the actions and human interactions of a single individual, a man 
who was representative of the settler cultural group but very involved with both Indians 
and white officials, helps the historiography move beyond facile generalizations about 
frontier people and show tangible ways that settlers influenced North American culture 
and approaches to space. 
2
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I organize this chapter around the exploits of one man, Michael Cresap (1742-
1775), a settler from western Maryland who embodied both the positive and negative 
traits traditionally associated with the 'frontier type': he was fiercely independent and a 
leading patriot but also a scheming landjobber and an Indian hater. Yet Cresap also 
played a prominent individual role on the Ohio frontier in the decade from 1765 to 1775. 
He established an illegal settlement beyond the Proclamation Line, claimed lands in Ohio 
that had already been surveyed by prominent colonial speculators, and had such a central 
role as an Indian killer in Dunmore's War that many contemporaries referred to that 
conflict as Cresap's War. 
Most importantly, Cresap can be understood as an exemplar of the settler 
approach to land, a powerful way of conceiving and claiming space that, by the end of the 
colonial era, was co-opted by more powerful whites for their own territorial purposes. 
Largely because of Cresap's own actions, many elites interested in the Virginia and 
Pennsylvania backcountry underwent a surprisingly rapid shift in their approach to 
claiming and settling land, one that had more in common with Cresap's violent and 
unauthorized ethic than that of officials and gentlemen only a decade or so earlier. 
From 1773 to 1775, Virginians who were both commissioned military officers 
and trained surveyors (men like Col. George Washington, Col. William Preston, Col. 
William Crawford, and Col. Andrew Lewis) took on the role of warrior-surveyors, 
officials who used Cresap's methods on a much larger scale to impose their control over 
the Ohio frontier. Although these warrior-surveyors replaced the imprecise delineations 
of settlers with the precise surveys that were so fundamental to their spatial conception, 
the means by which they established and legitimized these boundaries resembled the 
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extralegal methods of Michael Cresap that officials decried. The official appropriation of 
the settler approach to land would reach its climax during Dunmore's War, a clash with 
western Indians (catalyzed by Michael Cresap) in which Lord Dunmore, without 
authorization, sent surveyor-led armies to force an official spatial system onto Indian 
lands in the Ohio Valley. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the spatial conceptions and technologies 
central to how settlers understood and claimed land in the backcountry. I will then 
present some background information on Michael Cresap before examining his career 
between 1765 and 1775, a decade in which he was a founder of an illegal settlement at 
Redstone Creek, an active landjobber, and a renowned Indian killer. This account, 
however, is not intended to be strictly biographical. I use the events surrounding Cresap 
both to illustrate how the settler attitude towards land proved very successful in making 
onsite land claims and to show how this frontiersman's approach to land was a direct 
influence on how prominent elites came to claim territory circa 1773. 
* * * 
Despite being a multiethnic group, the poor white settlers that inhabited the North 
American backcountry during the eighteenth century shared a distinctive culture, the 
nuances of which have been noted by scholars and contemporaries alike. The cultural 
geographers Terry G. Jordan and Matti Kaups listed several of the most ubiquitous 
features of the "socio-cultural type that characterized the midland American frontier," 
including: the nuclear family as the dominant social unit; disrespect for law and 
government; individualism; lack of attachment to place and thus high mobility; little 
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concern for ecology; slash and burn agriculture; and a tendency to settle on remote 
homesteads instead of villages.4 For educated eighteenth century observers, such traits 
demonstrated that settlers had gone beyond the pale of civilization, both culturally and 
geographically. 
Settlers' departure from European norms allowed them to perfect a system of 
conceiving and occupying space that was perfectly suited for their mobile, anti-
authoritarian, and family-based culture. Settlers considered unoccupied lands (including 
many that were inhabited by Indians) to be available to anyone who could establish their 
physical presence on the landscape. This practice of "getting land and taking it up"5 was 
based loosely on Lockean principles that whoever made "improvements" on a given 
chunk of space was its owner by natural right.6 
Thus Joseph Doddridge, a settler who grew up in late colonial western 
Pennsylvania, recollected the common belief that "the country belonged of right to those 
who chose to settle in it."7 A far more vehement supporter of settler rights, the North 
Carolina Regulator Hermon Husband, declared that "peaceable Possession, especially of 
back waste vacant lands... is a Kind of Right."8 The tracts settlers claimed were, ideally, 
just large enough to support the nuclear family and far enough removed from the centers 
4
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of Anglo-American authority that frontiersmen could ensure their treasured 
independence. Also, tracts could be claimed and taken up with striking speed, so that 
when settlers felt any of their freedoms threatened, their settlements could be abandoned 
and new ones established that satisfied their individualism and quenched their "passion 
for migration."9 
Very few settlers had anything resembling a formal education, thus their cultural 
spatial conceptions were not based on the learned and non-intuitive geographical 
principles that organized how educated whites saw the world. Even fewer had the skills 
to conduct geometrically precise surveys. Being "neither...remarkable for science or 
urbanity of manners," they did not have the mathematical knowledge to do geometrical 
surveys nor the money for (or access to) the instruments that made them possible.10 Yet 
settlers had no need for these formal conventions. Their claims were based on physical 
occupation and development, a much more tangible feature on the landscape than the 
onsite surveys of officials, much less the mapped borders forwarded by Indians. 
Furthermore, formal surveys were slow because they relied on bureaucratic approval and 
painstaking measurements. 
Settler culture demanded a much faster practice, not only to secure a claim amidst 
intense competition for land, but because the very marks of possession—the crops and 
cabins discussed below— were requisite for survival. In lieu of the several precision 
tools used by officials to conceive and claim land, settlers who were claiming space 
relied on a single inherently imprecise though durable and efficient technology: the axe. 
9
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According to Michel-Guillaume Jean de Crevecoeur, author of Letters from an American 
Farmer, "the axe, that is the principle tool the American wants, and particularly the back-
settlers."11 The "broad axe" of the backwoods had its origins in Scandinavia, a heavier 
and stronger felling instrument than the axes made in Britain.1" With this sophisticated 
though clumsy tool, ecologically negligent frontiersmen with "the distressing habit of 
looking at trees only as enemies" effected a dramatic transformation of the backcountry 
landscape within a few short generations.13 
The axe was the technology central to every method that settlers used to 
legitimize their claims to backcountry tracts. Tomahawk rights, clearing land, and 
erecting cabins and fences all used the axe to establish one's visible presence on the 
landscape and, in the case of the cabin, were key to survival. Corn rights, a recognized 
claim based on cultivating a small crop of grain, was also dependent on the axe because 
corn needed the space and sunlight made available by felling trees. 
Tomahawk rights were based loosely on the surveyor practice of blazing 
territorial boundary markers onto trees, but settlers adapted it to their ad hoc and 
imprecise system for rapidly claiming land. Essentially, settlers used their axes to hack a 
mark into the trees that they considered to constitute the bounds of their rather arbitrary 
claims. According to Doddridge, "there was, at an early period of our settlements, an 
inferior kind of land title denominated a tomahawk right, which was made by... marking 
11
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the bark of some one, or more [trees] with the initials of the name of the person who 
made the improvement."14 Although "almost the whole tract of country between the 
Ohio and the Muskingum was parceled out in Tomahawk Improvements," the endurance 
of these claims could only be ensured by human occupation of the delineated site. 
Doddridge thus claimed "I have no knowledge of the efficacy of the tomahawk 
improvement, or whether it conferred any right whatever, unless followed by an actual 
settlement."16 
Just as settlers paid little regard to formally surveyed though unsettled lands, so 
too they would have had no qualms with establishing themselves on a tract delineated by 
tomahawk rights but undefended onsite. Active defense was indeed quite necessary; 
when those "with a view to actual settlement" wanted to supersede tomahawk claims, 
"they deliberately cut a few good hickories, and gave [the claimants] what was called in 
those days a laced jacket, that is a good whipping."17 Just as settlers used brute force to 
oust Indians from desired lands, they were often willing to use similar though less lethal 
tactics to evict fellow settlers. 
Axes were most actively employed for clearing land and building cabins, the 
fundamental processes by which settlers imposed their spatial ideals onto nature. 
Benjamin Rush wrote that a settler's "first objective [was] to build a rough cabin for 
himself and his family."18 The cabins and fences—both built of axe-hewn logs—were a 
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settler's proof of occupation, defensive bulwark, and single-family shelter against the 
elements. Deforestation of settlement tracts was such a vital part of "the march of the 
Europeans towards the interior parts of [the] continent" that Crevecoeur wrote "he who 
would see America in its proper light...must visit our extended frontier...where he may 
see the first labours of settlement, the mode of clearing the earth."19 
This mode consisted of both felling trees and "deadening" them to clear space for 
a cabin and a crop of corn while also, by the very presence of the clearing, claiming the 
minimum bounds of the tract. A single proficient axman could fell an acre of woods in 
about seven to ten days and the stumps were usually left in the ground; most frontiersmen 
farmed with hoes instead of yoked animals, thus stumps did not present serious 
obstacles.20 Lazier settlers preferred clearing their chosen plots by "deadening" (or 
"girdling") the trees, which was "done by cutting a circle round the trees, two or three 
feet from the ground," a process that slowly killed the tree with minimal labor.2' 
The ecological impact of this method of claiming land went beyond the 
destruction of woodlands. Wild animals were overwhelmed by livestock and over-hunted 
by whites, a result that served to further anger Indian groups that relied on hunting for 
both meat and peltry. Although the newly cleared forests were initially very fertile 
(especially after the ash of burnt undergrowth provided a fertilizer), frontiersmen often 
neglected agricultural practices like crop rotation that would sustain the soil. The virgin 
soil produced high-yield, low-effort crops for only three to five years, at which point 
Crevecoeur, Letters from an American farmer, 50. 
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settlers would often clear land adjacent to their current clearing (sometimes even 
dragging their cabins with them) and begin the ecologically exhausting process anew. 
As marks of actual settlement and legal title, cabins became sites of contestation and 
fraud for people with designs on the land. Historian Alan Taylor noted how, on the 
Maine frontier, "competitors used violence purposefully and by paying attention to land 
laws channeled it to defend, seize, or destroy physical evidence of possession—especially 
buildings and fences."23 
Although the lack of authority on the mid-Atlantic frontier decreased the 
emphasis on litigation, occupation of a tract became all the more important because the 
courts were largely unable to decide a land dispute and ownership was usually settled on 
the simple basis of actual settlement. Cabins also allowed opportunistic frontiersmen a 
chance to perform a kind of onsite, small scale landjobbing scheme. As seen later in this 
chapter, Michael Cresap used this cabin-building tactic to claim choice lands on the Ohio 
(a trick that wealthier land speculators learned from him the hard way). 
These methods of claiming western lands were antithetical to the ordered process 
of western expansion promoted by British officials (not to mention the Indians' hope for 
racial separation through mapped boundaries), and officials blamed frontier people for 
fomenting the problems endemic to the backcountry. For British officials, formal 
geography and surveys were the basis of a geopolitical scene in which precise boundaries 
and elite authority ensured rational relations with Indians. The decidedly irrational way 
in which settlers claimed western lands, combined with their strident rejection of 
authority, made this elite vision impossible. 
22
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Yet, by 1773, it became apparent that colonial elites and officials interested in the 
backcountry of Virginia and Pennsylvania had come to employ settler methods of taking 
lands, and they ignored their own superiors just as settlers ignored them. In order to 
understand why this fundamental shift in attitudes to western land and the Indians living 
in them occurred where and when it did, it is illustrative to examine the career of Michael 
Cresap, a frontiersman directly involved in several ventures that had a direct impact on 
large scale speculators and the frontier itself. 
* * * 
Michael Cresap was, in the words of Theodore Roosevelt, "of the regular pioneer 
type" of the late colonial backcountry: ardently independent, desirous of acquiring 
western lands without regard to formal conventions, and "inclined to regard any red man, 
whether hostile or friendly, as a being who should be slain on sight."24 Yet what set 
Cresap apart from the anonymous masses of settlers was that he did all of these things on 
as large a scale as possible. Through both illegal Indian treaties and an exaggerated use 
of tomahawk rights, Cresap claimed far more land than the typical family-sized plots 
sought by settlers and, from the time he was twenty-one, was renowned as one of the 
preeminent Indian killers in western Maryland. 
His interest in land can be traced to his father, Thomas Cresap, a man who was 
involved with Maryland's various frontier claims throughout his incredibly long life (he 
lived to be 109). Soon after immigrating to Maryland, Thomas Cresap settled on the 
Susquehanna (actually in Pennsylvania) and became such a fierce agitator for expanding 
Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, 202. 
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Maryland's northern boundary that Charles Mason, himself enmeshed in the details of 
this dispute, noted how 
The People near the supposed Boundary Line were then [in 1736] at open war [and] 
one Mr. Crisep defended his house as being in Maryland, with 14 Men, which [the 
Pennsylvanians] surrounded with about 55. [Cresap] would not surrender (but kept 
firing out) till the House was set on fire, and one man in the House lost his life 
coming out.25 
Upon his capture, Thomas Cresap was taken to Philadelphia, where the 
"Maryland monster...taunted the crowd by exclaiming...'Why this is the finest city in 
the Province of Maryland^"26 Soon after this affair, Thomas removed to Maryland's 
western frontier, where he became one of the founding members of the Ohio Company, 
and—after acquiring "a sufficient knowledge of mathematics"—-was appointed surveyor 
of Prince Georges County.27 In 1770, Thomas was given the opportunity to define one of 
Maryland's boundaries (which, apparently, he held quite dear) when he was 
commissioned to survey the province's Potomac River border with Virginia. 
Significantly, his youngest son Michael accompanied him in this survey, giving the 
Charles Mason, The Journal of Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon, transcribed by A. Hughlett Mason 
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young frontiersman an opportunity to learn some of the finer points of how officials saw 
and claimed land. 
Charles Mason would no doubt have been shocked to learn that the same "Mr. 
Crisep" who rudely fought for his personal space on Maryland's northern border actually 
became the public surveyor for its western one many years later. The shift in Thomas 
Cresap's conception of space—from that of an uneducated frontiersman to a scientifically 
grounded surveyor—was quite rare and few frontiersmen had access to this kind of 
learning. This change, though, is indicative of how in the last years of the colonial era, 
the boundaries between settler and official approaches to land had begun to blur. 
Despite some formal education and his time as a surveyor's assistant, Michael 
Cresap's methods and technologies for claiming and delineating land remained those of a 
frontiersman.29 He chose to use axes (not chains, compasses, or theodolites) to make 
claims that were legitimized through clearing land, building cabins, and actual settlement. 
Yet Cresap did have a geographer's eye for the big picture, conceiving of space as a vast 
expanse that could be acquired through onsite delineation or quasi-official treaties and 
then subdivided for personal profit. This dichotomy in Michael Cresap's approach to 
land—using extralegal settler methods on an official scale and for typical official ends— 
would prove very disruptive to Indians' and white officials' plans for frontier space. The 
fact that his technique was incredibly successful led several wealthy and land-hungry 
whites to co-opt his methods, albeit on an even larger scale. 
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The most startling difference, though, between Thomas and Michael Cresap was 
that Michael obviously hated Indians as a race. Thomas had been an Indian trader on the 
Maryland frontier and had served as a colonel in the Seven Years War, but he did not 
evince any of the overt racism that first became manifest in the early 1760s. Michael, 
however, had more in common with the Paxton Boys than his father, and throughout his 
life exhibited an intense hatred for Native Americans. In the words of historian Robert 
G. Parkinson, "Michael Cresap killed Indians. This is just about all anyone outside the 
frontier knew about the Maryland settler prior to the Revolution." Indeed, in 1763 (the 
same year as the Paxton massacre), when Michael was only twenty-one, the Maryland 
Gazette reported that "we had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Michael Cresap arrive in town 
with mokosins on his legs, taken from an Indian whom he killed and scalped." 
Even more startling is the account left by the Moravian missionary John 
Heckewelder, which related the impression that Cresap left on western Indians after 
twelve years of murdering them. Heckewelder reported that "so detestable became his 
name among the Indians, that I have frequently heard them apply it to the worst of things; 
On the Indian/white racism of the post Seven Years War period, see Jane T. Merritt, At The Crossroads: 
Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
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also, in quieting their children, I have heard them say, hush! Cresap will fetch you." 
Whether Michael was motivated by the Indian raids of the Seven Years War—and the 
subsequent feeling of betrayal that Jane Merritt considers key to the rise of Indian 
hating—cannot be known. But what is clear is that Michael Cresap did not value Indians 
right to live and, by extension, he valued their rights to land even less. 
Unfortunately, just as Michael Cresap's methods of securing lands seem to have 
shaped how officials claimed frontier territory, so too did his propensity to kill Indians 
seem to have prompted more powerful colonials do the same. Although it would be 
imprudent to assign too much credit to Cresap for effecting this shift (there are far too 
many factors involved to give agency to any one man), it is nevertheless suggestive that it 
was Cresap's Indian murders that started Dunmore's War, a conflict in which warrior-
surveyors employing Cresap's approach to land were quick to adopt his brutal practices 
with Indians. To elucidate how Cresap's Indian hating interacted with his landjobbing, 
and how both impacted how white authorities dealt with the West, I will begin with his 
first venture to attract official attention: his illegal settlement at Redstone Creek. 
* * * 
In 1765, Governor Penn of Pennsylvania wrote to Governor Fauquier of Virginia 
that "many ill disposed persons, in contempt of the Royal Proclamation of the 7th of 
October, 1763, and in violation of the Rights of the Natives, have without authority... 
John Heckewelder, "The declaration of Mr. John Heckewelder," in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. 
Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial 
Association, 1904), 321. 
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dared to seat themselves on Lands near Redstone Creek." The Redstone Creek 
settlement, near present day Brownsville in southwest Pennsylvania, prompted a struggle 
in which the settlers continually overwhelmed the combined efforts of western Indians 
and the British Army until the Indian Boundary Line was moved further west in 1768. 
This settlement and the Indian and official efforts to remove it highlighted the lack of any 
real authority (either colonial or British) on the frontier and fed fuel to fears that a racial 
war between whites and Indians was imminent. 
Michael and Thomas Cresap were the leaders of this enterprise. They "held a 
treaty with forty Six Nations warriors, In Which, [the Indians], by Deed, ceded...a large 
extent of Land, down the Ohio."35 This treaty was very illegal; not only did it create a 
white settlement in lands that the king had reserved for Indians (and that Indians 
themselves considered a racial homeland), but it did so without the approval of Whitehall 
or colonial governors. Many British and colonial officials, especially those with their 
own schemes for acquiring western lands, feared that the Cresaps' insolence would 
inspire others to make similar illegal treaties with western Indian groups. 
Thus some of the Suffering Traders wrote Sir William Johnson that "we are 
uneasy, least such contracts may produce discontent; For others will no Doubt, follow 
such unwarrantable Practices & for Small Considerations... beguile them into a Disposal 
34
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of their Lands." Indeed, their suspicions were well founded. Ten years after the 
Redstone treaty, "A Certain Richard Henderson...confederating with divers other 
Persons, hath, in open Violation of [the] Royal Proclamation...entered into Treaty with 
certain Indians of the Cherokee Nation, for the Purchase & Cession of.. .200 miles 
square."37 
This illegal negotiation, the Treaty of Watauga, was yet another case in which the 
Cherokee chief Attakullakulla demonstrated his willingness and ability to conduct land 
affairs outside of official circles.38 More importantly, the Treaty of Watauga was an 
example of social elites (Henderson was a judge) employing one of Cresap's many 
underhanded means of claiming territory. As early as 1765, Cresap was already setting 
precedents that powerful colonials could co-opt to overstep both geographical and ethical 
boundaries in their pursuit of space. 
Although the land deal was legitimized with a quasi-official treaty, the Cresaps 
used settler spatial conventions to claim the land onsite. In June of 1765, when the 
settlement was first being established, the Seneca chief Ogista complained to Sir William 
Johnson that "several white Families are settled on Red Stone Creek, and have planted 
Corn, with Peter, a Mohawk Indian."39 The planting of corn would, by necessity, have 
been preceded by clearing the forest and the felled logs were turned into fences and 
36
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cabins. The corn, cleared land, and buildings would all have been recognized by other 
would-be settlers as marks of possession.40 
The settlement was still in its infancy, but Ogista realized that it was illegal and 
threatened the sovereignty of Indian country and thus asked the British government to 
remove the "white Families" and "White Hunters" from lands west of the Appalachians. 
Ogista's insistence that all whites be removed was based on both the lawful and 
geographical separation enforced by the Proclamation Line as well as the tenets of pan-
Indianism that Neolin had promulgated. Thus Ogista told Johnson that though all white 
settlers and hunters must be removed, "the Mohawk Indian [Peter], we have no Objection 
to his living there with his Family, as he is one of ourselves."41 
Yet the Indians failed to understand settler ideas of land ownership. Out of 
compassion or pity (apparently), Ogista said "we do not desire [the settlers] should lose 
their labour; but when they have reaped their Corn, we hope they will be removed."42 
Corn rights, as far as they had any actual legal basis, gave land ownership to whoever 
planted and reaped a crop of corn. More concretely, if Indians had destroyed their crop 
or removed them before the harvest, the settlers would not have been able to sustain 
themselves. As with building cabins, corn rights served the overlapping purposes of 
staking a claim and providing the means of survival. In hindsight, the Indians would 
Although I have found no direct evidence that the Redstone settlers used tomahawk rights, a 1766 
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have been wise to remove the settlers before a ripened crop gave them a more secure and 
legitimate foothold in Indian country. 
Only one year after the settlement was established, British officials began a long 
and unsuccessful effort to remove the Cresaps and other settlers from Redstone Creek. 
Governor John Perm issued a 1766 Proclamation that all trans-Appalachian settlers return 
to the white side of the Proclamation Line and Thomas Gage, commander in chief of 
Britain's American forces, ordered the garrison at Fort Pitt "to drive the settlers from Red 
Stone Creek & other Places by Force, recommending it as proper that some Indian Chiefs 
should be with the Troops and witness of our Earnest Desire to Relieve them." 
Alexander McKee, with soldiers and several headmen of the Six Nations, delivered the 
notice to vacate, and, in 1766, the settlers did in fact leave and their cabins were burnt.44 
Whereas the Indians in 1765 failed to destroy the corn that marked the Cresaps' 
claim to Redstone Creek, Gage and the British Army—who were genuinely interested in 
satisfying the Indians45—realized that it was necessary to remove all of the settlers' 
physical claims (and means of survival) from the landscape. Gage described how McKee 
"sent Partys to destroy as many Huts as they could find, to prevent more People from 
being tempted to seat themselves upon those Lands."46 Gage also tried to correct the 
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Indians' 1765 mistake of allowing the Redstone settlers to reap their harvest, suggesting 
that "the Spring will be the proper time to remove the Settlers, and then prevent their 
Sowing."47 
Gage hoped that destroying the settlers' physical marks of possession and forcing 
them to return east would solve the problem, but, as he admitted in 1768, "altho' many 
steps were taken for their removal they have hitherto proved ineffectual." The Fort Pitt 
garrison made several forays to Redstone Creek, but every time they threw the settlers 
out, even more would return to reclaim the land. There were three main reasons why, 
despite their best efforts, the army could not keep the settlers out of Redstone: the 
efficiency of the settler land-claim system, the failure to replace the settler-created 
landscape with a different one, and jurisdictional disputes among the colonies. 
Once a tract was cleared, there was really very little work needed to establish or 
reestablish settlement. Even if all of their cabins and crops were destroyed, the settlers 
needed merely to erect a new hovel and sow another couple acres of corn in order to 
repossess the Indians' lands. Although McKee had told them that they would not be 
protected if Indians were to attack, the western nations were unwilling to kill the settlers 
outright for fear of reprisals and upsetting the delicate peace they considered necessary to 
keeping legal rights to Indian country. Thus, as long as the settlers had the endurance to 
return each year, their simple and efficient system of claiming space would preclude all 
the army's efforts to evict them. 
The problem was that each time the settlers were forced off, the landscape they 
vacated at Redstone was not replaced with a new and different land system, one that 
47
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would prevent them from reestablishing themselves in their simple and efficient way. 
The most logical way for the British to have solved this issue would have been to survey 
and settle the west using formal conventions, but these measures, unlike those of settlers, 
could not be legitimate unless approved by colonial or British authority. This 
fundamental obstacle to removing settlers and stopping their many abuses of western 
Indians was one of the primary reasons given for pushing the Indian Boundary Line 
further west in 1768. 
Although colonial authority was notoriously weak in the west, governments lost 
all pretense of power in areas where there was no clear jurisdiction. As Governor Penn 
noted to Governor Fauquier in 1766, "when it is considered that as the Boundary Line 
between Virginia and Pennsylvania has not yet been ascertained, and it is probable the 
[Redstone] Settlements made by those lawless People, may shelter themselves under an 
unsettled or disputed jurisdiction."49 Even Gage, the overall commander in North 
America, found himself hampered by the fact that "those Lands...are Claimed by 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, or I should use less ceremony with [the settlers]."50 The 
question of which province owned Redstone Creek was supposed to have been decided 
by Mason and Dixon's latitudinal survey in 1767, but, as seen in the previous chapter, 
they were prevented from running the line to its planed terminus by Delawares in the 
Ohio Country and the Mohawk guides leading the party. 
Unfortunately for the Delawares and other western Indians, stopping Mason and 
Dixon kept their own country in jurisdictional limbo, a problem that helped prevent the 
Redstone settlers from being removed and even contributed to the armed invasion of 
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Dunmore's War. It is significant that formally surveyed boundaries, like Mason's and 
Dixon's, were so fundamental to official concepts of order and governance that neither 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, nor the British had full confidence in their right to remove 
settlers and their land system from a space that had not been officially delineated to any 
of them. 
Thomas Cresap worked to further complicate the issue of Redstone's jurisdiction. 
Arthur St. Clair described how "a ridiculous story that Mr. Cressap has spread with much 
industry that [Pennsylvania] did not extend beyond the Allegany Mountain, but that all to 
the westward of it was King's Land, has taken great hold of the people."51 Cresap, who 
had lived in and fought over the disputed Maryland/Pennsylvania boundary knew the 
importance of colonial jurisdiction to effective authority, thus he was wise to incite as 
much confusion as possible as to who really controlled Redstone Creek. 
For colonial and British officials, the greatest threat from the Cresaps' Redstone 
settlement was that it would catalyze the general Indian war that they feared so much in 
the 1760s and early 1770s. In June of 1765, only a few months after the first settlement 
at Redstone, William Johnson wrote that "[settlers have] begun to establish themselves in 
the Indian Country threatening to put all Indians to Death whom they might meet with," 
and that "through Mistaken Zeal or Madness, [they] are taking such Steps, as 
must...involve us in a general Indian War."52 Although Michael Cresap was not 
identified by name, boasts threatening to kill "all Indians" certainly sound like his modus 
operandi. 
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Another commenter in 1767 voiced the Indian complaints that "Near four hundred 
English families have settled On their hunting Country, at Redstone Creek.. .and that their 
Warriors...are much insulted by those Settlers And a great Many of Them have been 
Murdered." He thus "hoped that the Administration, will no longer delay.. .to confirm 
the Boundary between the Indians & us...otherwise...the colonies will, before the 
Spring, be involved in all the dreadfull Woes, of a general Indian War."53 Prior to 1768, 
the Indian Boundary Line was still invoked as a panacea, yet, as evinced by Dunmore's 
War, moving the Line westward did very little to stop violence in the backcountry. 
In a 1767 letter to William Johnson, George Croghan drew together several of the 
issues that I have addressed throughout the present study. By conflating geography, pan-
Indianism, racial violence, the Proclamation Line, the illegal Redstone settlement, and the 
Mason Dixon Line in one brief letter, Croghan illustrated just how interconnected all of 
these matters really were on the 1760s frontier. 
The Senicas said to the Delawares, & Shawanese, Brethren those Lands are Yours, 
as well as ours, God gave them to us to Live upon & before the White People shall 
settle them for nothing, we will sprinkle the Leaves with their Blood, or Die every 
Man of us in the attempt... 
I wish that Boundary [the Proclamation Line] had never been mention'd to them or 
that His Majesty had before now, Ordered it confirmed...And nothing now, will in 
my opinion prevent a War but taking a Cession from them, & paying them for their 
Lands. Not withstanding all the trouble that has been taken to remove the People 
settled on Redstone Creek, & Cheat River, I am well assured there are double the 
Number of Inhabitants in those two settlements than ever was before: And I hear the 
Indians have stopped the Surveyors [Mason and Dixon] a little beyond the Cheat 
River, from extending the Line between Pennsylvania and Maryland.4 
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Through his land schemes and Indian killings, Michael Cresap managed to involve 
himself in all of these affairs. His Redstone Creek settlement was an example of how 
settler land claims could get the better of formal authority, while his individual 
landjobbing, discussed in the next section, proved capable of undermining the surveyed 
land claims of colonial officials and elites. 
* * * 
The relocation of the Indian Boundary Line in 1768 and the removal of the British 
army from trans-Appalachian outposts like Fort Pitt in 1772 allowed wealthy speculators 
the freedom to grab up all of the western lands that they had coveted since before the 
Seven Years War. Initially, they tried to impose formal geographic order onto this 
territory by dividing it up with precise surveyed boundaries. Some of Virginia's most 
prominent surveyors, such as Cpt. Thomas Bullitt, Col. William Preston, and Col. 
William Crawford were sent by elite speculators to conduct cadastral surveys of their vast 
new claims. After a remarkably short time, however, some of these speculators changed 
how they claimed lands, abandoning formal conventions in favor of methods long 
employed by uneducated frontier settlers. A case study in which Michael Cresap directly 
influenced how North America's most famous land speculator legitimized his vast 
territorial claims helps demonstrate how and why this large and sudden shift in cultural 
approaches to space occurred. 
John Jacob, Michael Cresap's contemporary and biographer, wrote that "[Cresap] 
saw in the rich bottoms of the Ohio an ample fund if he succeeded in securing a title to 
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those lands." Although Cresap was familiar with (at least) the basics of formal 
surveying, he had learned from the Redstone settlement the many advantages of settler-
style land claims and, in 1773, began making visible claims on the landscape. He thus 
"engaged six or seven active young men...and repairing to the then wilderness of Ohio, 
commenced the business of building houses and clearing lands; and being one of the first 
adventurers into this... region, he had it in his power to select some of the best and richest 
of Ohio bottoms."56 Building cabins and clearing land were key to legitimizing these 
tomahawk claims, and Cresap had no problem finding settlers eager to occupy his new 
improvements in the wilderness.57 
One of Cresap's apologists (there have been several of them) defended Cresap's 
seizure of these lands, maintaining that he was in Ohio "neither as a speculator nor a 
land-jobber...and he is no more to blamed for his manly progress into the wilderness in 
quest of land than George Washington."58 Apart from the fact that this claim seems 
contrary to the evidence that Cresap was indeed a landjobber, it is interesting that he 
compared Cresap's "quest for land" with Washington's; the territory on the Ohio River 
that Cresap was claiming belonged to none other than George Washington himself. 
After the opening of the West to speculation in 1768, Washington was one of the 
magnates that claimed huge tracts of the best land and had them surveyed in order to 
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make his claim legal and obvious on the landscape. He had picked out many of his tracts 
while surveying along the Ohio in the 1750s and 1760s, but he sent William Preston and 
William Crawford to conduct the surveys that he considered essential to making a formal 
claim. Although the surveys were done in good order, most of Washington's lands 
remained un-cleared and unoccupied—at least until Michael Cresap and his small team of 
axmen started felling trees and building cabins on them. 
Cresap's incursions onto his land aggravated Washington's sensibilities as both a 
trained surveyor and a gentleman. Not only did Cresap flout the onsite delineations that 
were so central to Washington's youthful profession, but he failed to pay Washington the 
deference befitting of his status. In September of 1773, Washington wrote a polite but 
tense letter to Cresap, in which he cites the formal surveys as proof of ownership and 
seems indignant that Cresap had the gall to ignore them. 
When Capt Crawford went down the Ohio to survey, I desired him to run out this 
Land for me, which he accordingly did... I have heard (the truth of which I know 
not) that you [have] taken possession of it. If this information is true, I own I can 
conceive of no reason why you or any other person should attempt to disturb me in 
my claim to this land... I would feign hope that my information respecting your 
taking possession of this Land, is without foundation.. .1 am the first that [claimed it], 
and have had it surveyed to ascertain the bounds.59 
For Washington and many other educated whites, surveyed lines were sacrosanct 
boundaries that, by virtue of their precision and presence on the landscape, commanded 
respect. Yet Cresap, like most other frontiersman, had a strong aversion to authority, and 
neither supposedly authoritative surveys nor powerful figures like Washington pulled 
"To Michael Cresap, Mount Vemon, 26 Sept. 1773," in The Writings of George Washington, Vol. II, 
1758-1775, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, the Knickerbocker Press, 
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very much clout among settlers. In another act of insolence, Cresap did not even respond 
to this letter. 
The following year, in a message to lawyer Thomas Lewis, Washington voiced 
his annoyance that Cresap's imprecise system for claiming land could trump his legal 
rights and formal surveys. He was confounded by the fact that Cresap's claims were 
"founded on no other right, or pretense than that of claiming every good bottom upon the 
river; building a cabin thereon to keep off others, and then selling them, and going on to 
possess other Lands in the same manner." In a huff, he added that "Mr. Cresap's claim 
[was] set up long after I had made a choice of it, and had had it surveyed."60 Although he 
was no closer to regaining his lands, Washington was no fool and was quickly learning 
the nuances and advantages of how settlers claimed space as well as the shortcomings of 
more formal land systems. 
The fundamental problem, as Cresap forced Washington to realize, was that 
surveys and other formal means for securing a land title were useless unless accompanied 
by actual settlement.61 By the settler conception of space, "the country belonged of right 
to those who chose to settle in it," and no onsite claim (much less a mapped one) was 
respected unless someone lived on the tract in question. Nor did settlers necessarily 
acknowledge land claims made with typical settler conventions like tomahawk 
60
 "To Thomas Lewis, esq., 5 May 1774," in The Writings of George Washington, Vol. II, 1758-1775,409. 
61
 For more on how settlers flouted elites' legal standards for land ownership, see Henry Tatter, The 
Preferential Treatment of Actual Settlers in the Primary Disposition of the Vacant Lands in the United 
States to 1841; Preemption: Prelude to Homesteadism, Ph.D. Dissertation (Northwestern University, 
1933). 
62
 Doddridge, Notes on the Settlement and Indian Wars, 133. 
112 
improvements because they "conferred [no] right whatever, unless followed by an actual 
settlement."63 
Finding himself unable to take any effective measures to prevent Cresap from 
claiming and selling his lands, George Washington endeavored to beat the settler at his 
own game. Washington mobilized many men and much capital in order to make settler-
style claims on the landscape in a manner that mirrored Cresap's method of landjobbing. 
Yet whereas Cresap "engaged six or seven active young men" to clear land and build 
cabins, Washington could make such claims on a much larger scale.64 
Therefore, in March of 1775, Washington hired William Stevens to lead a 
campaign to establish his land rights using methods pioneered by Cresap and other 
backwoods landjobbers. In his instructions to Stevens, Washington enjoined him "So 
soon as you have pitched upon the Spot to begin your Improvements on, use every 
diligence in your power to get as much Land as possible ready for Corn, and continue 
planting...you may, in the meanwhile, be putting up your houses."65 Washington's plan 
to grab-up land by planting corn and building houses was a sharp departure from the 
precision measures with which he and his fellow surveyors had claimed land only a few 
years previously. Stevens' party consisted mostly of slaves and servants who would be 
used to settle on these lands, thus actualizing Washington's corn rights to Ohio tracts.66 
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After the first plots were seized through building, planting, and occupation, 
Washington encouraged Stevens "to go on to other kinds of improvements as will go the 
furthest in saving the Land—that is, you are to build—to clear—to fence."67 Clearing, 
building, and fencing—combined with onsite settlement—were the lynchpins of settler 
land claims, and the fact that Washington considered that these methods, not formal 
surveys, "will go furthest in saving the land" evinced just how strongly he had come to 
believe in the power of the settler land system. More than anything else, it was Michael 
Cresap's example of success that led Washington to co-opt settler methods for claiming 
land. 
The most important difference, though, between Cresap's and Washington's use 
of settler land claims was the scope of their projects. Both were landjobbers, but only 
elites like Washington could operate on a scale large enough to impact the overall 
geopolitical situation of the North American backcountry. To be sure, the sheer mass of 
unruly settlers was a critical force in this period, one that alarmed both officials and 
Indians. Yet the actions of frontiersmen on the whole lacked the sort of organization that 
would allow them to coordinate in order to achieve some specific goal. Indeed, the 
general individualism of frontier people precluded the desire for such cooperation. It 
took powerful men like Washington and, as seen below, Lord Dunmore, who were 
capable of combining the settler land system with a grand vision and vast resources, to 
realize the full potential of Cresap's practices for acquiring and dominating western 
lands. 
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* * * 
Unfortunately for western Indians, whites using Cresap's land methods realized 
that his brutal attitude towards Indians could also be writ large. Just as Michael Cresap 
had long been happy to kill Indians at a local level, Virginians in 1774 waged a full-scale 
war against western nations, one that conflated violence and landjobbing on a scale that 
would have profound impacts on North American history. Dunmore's War (1774), often 
called Cresap's War by contemporaries, was yet another instance in which Michael 
Cresap both directly instigated discord in the West and set a precedent that more 
powerful men would emulate for their own purposes. 
In the late spring of 1774, Michael Cresap killed several Indians on the frontier. 
He gathered a posse of vigilantes from the area near Redstone Creek and, after shooting 
two Indians passing by in a canoe, boasted that "he wou'd put every Indian he mett with 
on the River to Death."69 The next day, "Cressop with others...causelessly surprised, & 
There has been a significant debate concerning Cresap's exact role in the Indian murders preceding 
Dunmore's War. Accounts from June and July of 1774 all point to Cresap as the leader of the party of 
vigilantes that did the first killings, but controversy arose over the accusation that Cresap was responsible 
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Greathouse who killed Logan's relations. Thomas Jefferson reprinted Logan's speech in his Notes on the 
State of Virginia as an example of Indian eloquence, but many of Cresap's friends (Cresap himself was 
dead by this time) were offended by this accusation and went to great pains to clear Cresap's name. In their 
zeal on Cresap's behalf, some writers (most notably John Jacob) tried averring that Cresap was actually a 
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murdered near 30 Indians partly Shawanese but principally of the Six Nations." 
Cresap, like the Paxton Boys, did not draw distinctions between various nations, 
attacking all Indians as a coherent race that deserved to be exterminated. 
The killing of the Iroquois particularly galled William Johnson because that group 
had long been an important ally of the British (and Johnson in particular) and he feared 
that such violence against the Iroquois would spur them into leading a pan-Indian war 
against the colonies. The news of Cresap's killings was so disturbing to the Iroquois that 
newspapers reported "all the Chiefs and Head Warriors of the Six Nations, are now on 
their Way to Sir William Johnson's, to hold a Congress on the alarming news they 
received of the Murders committed by Cressap," a meeting that was attended by "6 or 
700" Indians.71 By the summer of 1774, however, it was doubtful that war could be 
prevented any longer. Cresap's killings had put many western Indians in a rage and Lord 
Dunmore had already begun mobilizing Virginian militias and sending them to the Ohio. 
Just as Cresap was able to take advantage of the disputed jurisdiction of Redstone 
Creek in the 1760s, he was able to exploit the same lack of colonial authority to get away 
with murder. Pennsylvania and Virginia both continued to claim this region (the Mason 
and Dixon Line was still incomplete) and thus neither could exercise the necessary 
authority to prevent or punish such outrages. The problem was exacerbated by the fact 
that, in 1772, the British army abandoned Fort Pitt and other trans-Appalachian outposts. 
Since the Seven Years War, the army had done much to protect Ohio Indians from the 
violent advance of frontier settlers and the power vacuum they left in their wake exposed 
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western Indians to incursions from settlers and prominent colonists alike. By "relying 
on the impotence of the Several Governmts," Cresap was able to kill with impunity while 
white squatters overwhelmed the Ohio valley. 
The removal of the army provided opportunistic elites with an opportunity to 
follow Cresap's example once more. Colonial power had always been weak in the west, 
but the army had provided a bulwark of British power that had prevented Cresap-esque 
measures from taking place on a grand scale. It is no surprise, then, that an organized 
invasion of the Ohio Valley for the dual purposes of Indian killing and landjobbing 
occurred merely two years after the British army abandoned the Ohio Country. 
Although the Ohio Country was disputed by Pennsylvania and Virginia, it was 
Lord Dunmore's Virginia that took the more active role in laying claim to it by exercising 
Cresap's approach to land and Indians on a scale befitting the largest province in British 
America. Since the early 1760s, Michael Cresap had considered killing Indians and 
acquiring land to go hand in hand while the Virginia government expanded its boundaries 
through Indian treaties and surveyed boundaries. With the army out of the Ohio Country 
and Pennsylvanian surveyors carving up the best lands for themselves, Dunmore knew he 
had to establish his own Ohio claims efficiently and decisively. 
Just as George Washington had learned, Cresap's methods were the most 
effective way to accomplish this. Not only were they a model for how Dunmore could 
realize Virginia's claim, but Cresap's 1774 murders and the fear of Indian war they 
engendered also gave Dunmore an incentive to act. It is therefore not surprising that 
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"young Cressap, who first began the quarrel with the Indians, and murdered a number of 
them in a cowardly manner, has received a letter of thanks from Lord Dunmore." 
Although Dunmore sought to exculpate himself in this letter from accusations that 
he was one of "a scheming party in Virginia...who, being mostly land jobbers, would 
wish to have those lands," it was he who had ordered an official incursion into the Ohio 
Country without the approval of the British government.75 Indeed, Dunmore's blatant 
disregard for authority was yet another way in which he acted more like a settler than a 
gentleman. 
Dunmore entrusted the military invasion of the Ohio Country to the leadership of 
a corps of warrior-surveyors, men that would simultaneously kill Indians and claim their 
land. Among these was Michael Cresap, to whom Dunmore gave a captain's 
commission, but "Cressop [was] a Marylander, and never was an inhabitant of Virginia" 
and never led more than a small force of frontiersmen. To actualize the expansion of 
his colony, Dunmore gave command of his army to Virginians who promoted the 
enlargement of Virginia, had military backgrounds, and were official surveyors. 
Three of the armies that Dunmore sent against the Ohio Indians in 1774 were 
commanded by Virginian warrior-surveyors: Col. Andrew Lewis, Col. William Preston, 
The Norwich Packet and the Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island Weekly 
Advertiser, July 21, 1774, "Philadelphia, July 13, Extract of a Letter from Carlisle, July 4, 1774." 
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and Capt. William Crawford. Andrew Lewis, as seen in the previous chapter, was a 
staunch advocate for expanding Virginia and affiliated with the Loyal and Greenbrier 
land companies.78 He was one of the original surveyors appointed to run Virginia's 
Indian Boundary Line as agreed upon at the Treaty of Hard Labor (1768) and had fought 
with George Washington in the Seven Years War. William Preston was the official 
surveyor of Fincastle County and, in the early 1770s, had been leading surveying parties 
that were claiming Ohio land for Washington and other veterans. William Crawford, 
another officer from the Seven Years War, had conducted surveys on the Ohio River 
(ones that Cresap blatantly ignored) and, in 1773, scouted and surveyed western lands 
with Lord Dunmore. 
Whether they were conscious of it or not, these warrior-surveyors followed 
Michael Cresap's example, both by killing Indians as racial enemies and using this 
violence to secure possession of lands. In June, Hugh Wallace wrote to William Johnson 
that Cresap had "sent a Blankett & a Scalp of a Cheiff [to] Governor Eden as a Trophy of 
70 
his Valour." Amazed that Cresap "was not put in Jail for his murder" by the 
government of Virginia, he concluded that "Virginia Maryland & Pensilva seem striving 
who can get the Lands fastest & I fancy this is all just a Land Jobbing Scheme."80 The 
fact that Dunmore thanked and commissioned Cresap instead of censuring him for such 
illegal and brutal murders gives credence to Wallace's suspicions. 
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Like Cresap, the warrior-surveyors sought to use brutal violence to terrorize and 
displace Indians; indeed, they seemed thrilled by the chance to do so. In a circular letter 
meant to recruit volunteers, William Preston did not try to hide his eagerness at the 
upcoming "Opportunity of reducing our old Inveterate Enemies." Preston's fusion of 
the several Indian nations into the facile category of "Inveterate Enemies" substantiated 
just how prevalent the racial hatred that blossomed in the early 1760s had become by the 
last years of the colonial era. 
This hate was made manifest in the way the warrior-surveyors waged war. 
Despite the fact that they led official Virginian armies, they ignored the European rules of 
combat meant to civilize war and eagerly employed savage tactics like scalping hitherto 
used by vigilantes such as the Paxton Boys and Michael Cresap. At the Battle of Point 
Pleasant, the largest and most decisive battle of Dunmore's War, Col. Lewis' 1400 
recruits were so enthralled with scalping the fallen Shawanees for trophies that the 
Indians "scalped themselves to prevent [whites]" from so doing.82 Although such 
practices had long been associated with Indian hating frontiersmen like Cresap, 
Dunmore's War used them on a grand scale and, most importantly, as official tools of the 
provincial government. 
Just as the British army had attempted to remove Cresap's Redstone Creek 
settlement by destroying their villages and crops, so too did the warrior-surveyors 
displace western Indians by concentrating their attacks on Indian villages. Preston's 
circular letter spelled out how removing the Indians' onsite claims of houses and corn 
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would eliminate them from the landscape and allow for whites to use settler land methods 
to take it up for themselves. He seemed overjoyed that "This useless People may now 
aft] last be Obliged to abandon their Country, Theire Towns may be plundered and 
Burned, Their Cornfields Distroyed. [...] The Oppertunty we hav So long wished for, is 
now before us."83 
The focus on destroying crops and villages reflected that Preston recognized these 
as legitimate marks of possession, ones that had to be removed from the landscape before 
his own and those of other whites could be put in their place. The British army had failed 
to prevent the Redstone settlers from returning because, as royally protected Indian 
Country, no legitimate settlement could claim the land in their stead. By the frontier land 
ethic, that space was vacant after their departure and could be reclaimed simply by 
planting a new crop and building a new shack. Virginia's warrior-surveyors shared the 
British army's capacity to remove a settlement but, as trained surveyors and Cresap-
esque landjobbers, they had the power to impose new onsite claims to replace the Indian 
ones they had destroyed. 
Virginia's official deployment of settler methods for claiming land and the hatred 
of Indians that facilitated it marked a key turning point in how white North America dealt 
with Indians and their lands. The kind of ordered progress that Whitehall had promoted 
through a gradually moving Indian Boundary Line was replaced with a frontiersman's 
propensity to ignore Indian rights and use onsite settlement and force of arms to take the 
desired space. Well into the nineteenth century, the U.S. army would be used to remove 
Indians and destroy their settlements in order to make way for frontiersmen to establish 
their own marks of possession on the landscape. This policy of combining governmental 
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force with settler land claims was quite contrary to that of the British who, in the 1760s, 
had employed their army to protect Indians from settler encroachments. Virginia's 
surveyor-led armies were the first manifestation of this new American approach to land, 
but the U.S. government would become its ultimate practitioner, killing Indians to make 
way for settlement on a continental level. 
Of course, it would be saying too much to credit this shift to Michael Cresap 
alone, but this case study has, I hope, demonstrated quite tangible connections between 
his actions and example and the way in which white Americans on the whole came to 
approach Indian lands. Indian space had become something to be conquered by force and 
claimed onsite with an axe and physical occupation, a far cry from the precisely surveyed 
boundaries of racial separation advocated in the decade following the Seven Years War. 
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CODA 
BORDERING THE BORDERLANDS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
In both their internal and frontier surveys, the early United States made a 
deliberate effort to create what Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron called a "bordered 
land," a formally bounded polity that made clear distinctions between those inside the 
borders and those kept on the outside.1 Thus just as the Proclamation Line of 1763 had 
helped define Indians as the hated other in the colonial era, so too did the boundaries 
drawn between the U.S. and its neighbors (both Indian and creole) distinguish 
"Americans" from those people that inconveniently shared their continent. Over the first 
few decades of independence, internal boundaries like those made by the Land Ordinance 
of 1785 made settlers into citizens while international boundaries turned fluid imperial 
frontiers into strict divides.2 
It is surprising, then, that despite the emphasis placed on both frontiers and 
borderlands in the years following the work of Frederick Jackson Turner and Herbert 
Eugene Bolton there has been little attention paid to the processes by which these borders 
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(permeable or otherwise) were actually formed. To be sure, many scholars have looked 
at the politics and treaties involved with deciding borders, yet their actualization on the 
landscape has been neglected. The previous chapters have illustrated some of the 
intricacies of border-making (with Indian maps, official surveys, and informal settler 
methods) in the late colonial era. This coda provides a brief overview of the creation of 
boundaries in the first two decades of the independence period, a process that grew out of 
colonial era developments and set precedents for how the U.S. would claim and delineate 
land in the nineteenth century. 
The three colonial era systems for conceptualizing and claiming land examined in 
chapters one, two, and three all remained characteristic of their particular cultural group 
in the early independence period. Indians, though increasingly employing violent 
resistance to white expansion, continued to hold up their formal, European style maps as 
the flimsy aegis for ensuring their treaty-ratified boundaries. Officials, now employed by 
the United States (or individual states within it), still promoted onsite precision surveys, 
yet were evermore aware of the advantages that could be derived from the less rigidified 
settler land system and ignoring or rethinking Indian rights. Settlers pressed further west, 
using tomahawk and corn rights, yet their racial hatred of Indians led them to become 
more closely allied with white officials than they had been in the 1760s and 1770s. 
Although these three spatial systems would remain in conflict for several decades 
after the Revolution, it became clear by 1800 that the official, survey-legitimatized 
method for organizing land had emerged as the dominant means of dividing and claiming 
the American landscape. The United States government, not settlers, Indians, or 
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individual states, actively asserted itself as the authority that shaped America's 
boundaries. The young U.S. accomplished this by co-opting informal methods, 
especially the warrior-surveyor approach used by Lord Dunmore, and ignoring Indian 
claims to a far greater degree than the British had. 
Whereas official surveys of the colonial era, such as those of Mason and Dixon 
and Donelson, were left vulnerable to onsite manipulation by local Indians, warrior-
surveyors had the strength to ensure that precise and formal borders could be run without 
interference. The combination of scientific precision and military force proved so 
effective at imposing artificial lines on places and peoples that, by the end of the 
eighteenth century, the government trusted warrior-surveyors to force borders not only 
with settlers and Indians, but with powerful European empires. 
In the first two decades of the Republic, the U.S. government used armed survey 
parties to rationalize, legitimize, and actualize rigid boundaries for both the internal 
structure and external limits of the new country. The first large internal survey, that of 
the Ohio Country following the Land Ordinance of 1785, failed miserably during its first 
two years because it could not overcome the resistance of local Indians and settlers. 
Eventually, the U.S. was compelled to legitimize squatters and their informal land system 
and, in the process, set the foundation for an expansionist white Republic. 
The U.S.'s external boundaries, both with Indian groups and European colonies 
were, during the 1790s, largely the work of Major Andrew Ellicott and his U.S. army 
escort. Ellicott used warrior-surveyor methods to coerce Indian nations and European 
empires alike into accepting the U.S.'s desired borders, ones that met the criteria for 
geographic precision that were so important to the geographic and legal claims of U.S. 
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officials. The rational linear boundaries placed on the landscaped by dint of astronomy 
and armament—both within the U.S. and on its borders—were fundamental to making 
the U.S. spatially and politically sovereign. 
* * * 
The survey of the Ohio Country following the Land Ordinance of 1785 was the 
first major land project of the United States, delineating federally owned property in an 
effort to ensure ordered migration, preserve peace with Indians, and provide the federal 
government with much needed money.4 Yet the U.S. met with little success in the first 
two years of the survey. The problems were that the Ordinance of 1785 relied too 
heavily on the precision standards of formal geography and the inhabitants of the Old 
Northwest, both Indians and white settlers, considered the federal surveys to be a threat to 
their sovereignty. The government's plan and survey of the Northwest succeeded only 
after they co-opted settlers themselves and elements of their land ethic into the less 
precise though far more efficient Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 
With the United States' victory over Great Britain, U.S. officials reconceptualized 
Indian land rights to better legitimize their own ambitions. Whites who desired Indian 
lands in the late colonial period had claimed that, because of the tenets of natural law, 
Indians had the right to sell their land to whomever they chose. Thus British efforts to 
claim ownership of the West, like the Royal Proclamation, were considered unjust checks 
on white expansion. Officials in the early U.S., however, reverted to claims based on 
Norman law that made them de facto owners of Indian territories by conquest. The land 
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now belonged rightfully to the government, who could delineate and bound it as they 
chose. In the words of Robert A. Williams, "the Indians' rights, natural or 
otherwise...were to be unilaterally determined by an alien, Norman-derived tyrant."5 
The Land Ordinances of 1785 and 1787 were the manifestation of this conceptual shift. 
The U.S. government now thought it had an unlimited claim on western lands. 
As surveyors and speculators of the late colonial era had learned, though, an 
officially recognized right to western lands meant nothing without onsite delineation and, 
more importantly, actual settlement. Although the Land Ordinance of 1785 was meant to 
satisfy both of these conditions, the Ohio Country was already occupied by Indians and 
thousands of white settlers, both of whom were in the way of official plans to survey, 
sell, and settle that land. Squatters and Indians would have to be removed to make way 
for the formal surveys. 
Bringing Ohio Country lands under United States control was not only necessary 
for financial reasons, but to the very integrity of the United States.6 During the 
Revolution, eastern officials had no real control over events in the west and settlers had, 
in effect, formed an independent society based on their shared hatred of the Indian race. 
Westerners could threaten to secede as an independent state or, even worse, encourage a 
European power like Spain of Great Britain to annex them. 
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U.S. officials in 1784 hoped to secure allegiance and economic productivity from 
the Northwest by integrating it within the rational spatial system that regulated territories 
in the east. Indeed, the geographical plan they envisioned for the Northwest would be far 
more regular than the awkward state and property lines along the Atlantic. Not only 
would reason and scientific progress be manifest on the landscape, but these values 
would transform indolent and coarse western whites into productive and rational beings. 
As Peter S. Onuf wrote, "The land system itself would teach settlers to 'see' the western 
landscape—and their own opportunities within it—through the pattern of the grid that 
defined specific property holdings. Rational, systematic settlement would create 
enlightened communities."8 Eastern officials also hoped that their plan for northwestern 
land would discourage the economic individualism that had long characterized frontier 
types. Squatters tended to be subsistence farmers that depleted soil on land acquired for 
free, a poor basis for producing national wealth. 
In 1784, Thomas Jefferson, the leader of the committee assigned to drafting the 
Ordinance, proposed a plan for "disposing of LANDS in the WESTERN TERRITORY" 
that was a paradigm of reason and precision, both of which would stem from formal, 
globe-based geography.9 Jefferson wanted to replace the real landscape of the Northwest 
with a regular grid that followed the graticule instead of the compass because compasses 
were subject to inaccuracies while the globe's meridians and parallels were always exact 
and based on mathematic principles. All land divisions would be based on a decimal 
system of square tracts within several "hundreds," a 10 by 10 mile square. Each hundred 
8
 Onuf, Statehood and Union, 38. 
9
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would be subdivided into 100,000 acres, with 1,000 acres per square mile, 10 chains per 
side of each acre, and 100 links to a chain.10 Obviously, this neat and rational system did 
not work out in conventional measurements, where a standard mile was divided into 80 
chains and 640 acres made up a square mile.11 To fulfill his dream of geographic order, 
Jefferson created the "geographic mile," a distance equal to the length of one minute of 
latitude. According to Jefferson, the geographic mile was superior because "the globe of 
the earth itself...would furnish an invariable measure."12 Like the primers on formal 
geography presented in chapter two of this study, Jefferson saw the planetary globe as the 
basis of geographic precision, an ideal that officials were finally free to realize in the 
West. The Northwest's geographic, social, and racial irregularities would all be 
consumed by the surveyed grid. 
Congress modified Jefferson's 1784 proposal so that western lands could only be 
taken up by industrious settlers who would enrich Congress both by buying the lands 
from the federal government and developing them for export agriculture. Thus the Land 
Ordinance of 1785 required that the federal lands would be pre-surveyed, delineated on 
site before settlers were allowed to purchase and occupy them. Pre-surveys entailed a 
quasi-imperial claim to the land, one that overwrote those of current inhabitants: the 
10
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natural rights that had legitimized both Indians and settlers claims to land ownership in 
1*5 
the western state of nature were dissolved by Congressional fiat. By the Land 
Ordinance of 1785, purchasing a surveyed tract from the government was the only 
legitimate right to ownership, a situation that officials hoped would attract loyal and 
industrious settlers and justify the displacement of squatters and Indians. 
Congress knew that squatters and Indians alike would resist their plan, thus they 
employed a team of warrior-surveyors to ensure the execution of their vision. The 
surveyors would have the instruments and knowledge necessary to draw astronomically 
precise meridians and parallels on the countryside and, ideally, the military support to 
ensure that they would not be disturbed in their task. Each state was to send an official 
surveyor to accompany Captain Thomas Hutchins, Geographer of the United States, and 
of the eight surveyors who actually joined Hutchins in 1785, six were army officers.14 
Although Hutchins called his associates "the Gentlemen Surveyors" because of their 
geographic expertise, they would only be able to overcome the resistance of the 
inhabitants of Ohio if they acted as warriors first. 
The surveying parties of 1785, though, were not equal to this task. Hutchins was 
promised an escort from Colonel Josiah Harmar, commander of Fort Mcintosh, but 
Harmar did not have any men to spare.1 Furthermore, western Indian nations were 
invited to supply a contingent of chiefs to accompany the surveyors and help ensure their 
safety, much as the Iroquois had done for Mason and Dixon. Given the ongoing hostility 
13
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between western Indians and whites, and the fact that surveys entailed white ownership 
of Indian space, it is not surprising that they declined this offer. In the words of the 
Shawnee chief Kekewpellethy, "we do not understand measuring out the lands—it is all 
ours."16 Faced with the prospect of hostile Indians and unprotected by the government, 
Hutchins and the other surveyors were compelled to retreat after running a mere few 
miles of the grid (and, unfortunately for them, they were being paid by the mile). The 
warrior-surveyors had been reduced to astronomers without soldiers, a weak force for 
imposing new a geographic, social, and political order on a hostile land. 
Colonel Harmar had no troops for the surveyors because, undersupplied to begin 
with, he had also been ordered to remove squatters from the Ohio Country, a supposed 
precondition for fulfilling congress' vision of a loyal and profitable West. Based on their 
informal land system, settlers considered themselves legitimate owners of their property 
and were prepared to protect it from encroachments by the federal government.17 
Harmar noted how settlers were "accustomed to seat themselves on the best of 
lands, making a tomahawk right or Improvement, as they term it, supposing that to be 
sufficient Title," and that they were "averse to federal measures, and...wish to throw 
every obstacle in the way to impede surveying of the western Territory."18 To remove 
the squatters and make way for surveys and progress, Harmar sent a detachment of 
twenty men under Ensign Ebenezer Denny to destroy settlers' cabins and their crops of 
Speech of Chief Kekewepellethy at Fort Finney, in Pattison, Beginnings of the American Rectangular 
Land Survey System, 1784-1800, 115. 
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corn. This process, which entailed removing the physical claims of settlers from the 
landscaped itself, closely paralleled the attempts made by the British army in the 1760s to 
evict Michael Cresap and the others who had settled illegally at Redstone Creek. As with 
the Redstone settlement, the squatters departed after their corn and cabins were burnt, but 
they simply came back and reclaimed the land with these same visible rights of 
possession. 
In 1786, the surveys faired little better. Hutchins received four more surveyors 
(three of whom were military officers) and was given command of 150 troops to protect 
them against squatters and Indians (who had again declined to assist in the survey). 
Despite this fairly large body of men, they did not have the supplies to keep this force in 
the field, and only thirty soldiers could accompany the thirteen surveyors (who were split 
up into several parties) at any given time. Indian resistance to these surveys began almost 
immediately: instruments were stolen or destroyed, land markers were removed, and 
horses were driven off, all of which served to slow the survey and terrify the under-
9ft 
protected surveyors. When Hutchins got intelligence that the Shawnees were amassing 
for a full attack on the surveyors, they retreated to the safety of the East. 
The exigencies of pre-surveys along a globe-based grid had proven untenable in 
the Northwest Territory. The requisite instruments and experts made running meridian 
lines slow and expensive and the real weakness of the United States in the West was 
Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 240; Griffin, American Leviathan, 202; Andrew R.L. Cayton, The Frontier 
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manifest in the state's inability to provide sufficient protection for its surveyors. The 
problem was that the officials in charge of ordering the Northwest had forgotten the 
lessons learned by George Washington and Lord Dunmore in the early 1770s: that 
settlers and their land ethic were efficient and effective for claiming and settling land. 
Unless surveyors could be backed with a sufficient cadre of men and arms (which, in the 
mid 1780s, the U.S. could not supply), onsite surveys and the formal system of 
geography they supported would fail to shape the West. 
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that replaced the plan of 1785 was far more 
effectual because it incorporated settlers and their approach to land into the official 
project for developing the Ohio Country. Pre-surveys were no longer required and 
squatters' tomahawk claims could now be recognized by the state, although they would 
eventually have to be surveyed and registered. The Ordinance also included a 
comprehensive plan for making the federal territory into states equal to those in the East. 
Instead of trying to remove the settlers' landscape and immediately replace it with an 
artificial one, the 1787 Ordinance allowed a practical geo-political structure to grow out 
of the strong base for settlement that had been laid by squatters. 
In effect, the Northwest Ordinance created an alliance between settlers and 
officials, two cultural groups that had been at odds about western land since the Seven 
21
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Years War. Officials were finally glad to accept squatters because, without their support, 
the West would never develop into a loyal and productive region. Western settlers, in 
turn, had realized that they would not be able to drive off Indians without the help of the 
state, and were thus willing to endure some limits to their individual freedoms in order to 
better exterminate their racial enemy.22 The U.S. army ceased driving off squatters and, 
instead, joined them in their war against the Indians. 
This united racial front of white Americans was in many ways the death knell for 
the Indian nations in the territorial limits of the United States. Unfortunately for Native 
Americans, these "limits" kept expanding. Although undermanned warrior-surveyors 
had little success in the Northwest in 1785 and 1786, those sent to establish the external 
boundaries of the U.S. in the 1790s had much better support, and the limits of the young 
Republic quickly grew to subsume former Indian lands within the whites-only United 
States. 
* * * 
The Northwest Ordinance had helped to secure the internal structure of the nation, 
but strong and visible boundaries were needed to show the world, as well as Americans 
living in the various states, that the United States was a legitimate and unified state. By 
creating onsite boundaries around the Republic, surveyors helped make it visibly 
manifest that citizens in the various states all belonged to the United States, and that the 
people beyond those boundaries were either part of different polities or, in the case of 
Indians, stateless. In both cases, the tangible limits drawn on the landscape were 
22
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intended to impede the free mixing of peoples that had long existed on America's 
frontiers. Since the division between us and them would no longer be (as) fluid, it 
became increasingly important that the nation's boundaries were fixed in as advantageous 
a way as possible. Warrior-surveyors were thus employed to make certain it was the U.S. 
who gained the most from the process of bordering North America. 
Major Andrew Ellicott, the foremost border-maker of the early independence era, 
combined scientific expertise with the martial and diplomatic skills of a field general to 
force the U.S.'s chosen limits onto its neighbors. As a young man in the 1770s, he had 
already developed a reputation as an instrument maker and astronomer and, despite a 
Quaker upbringing, Ellicott became an officer during the Revolutionary war. 4 In 1784, 
he was given his first commission as a surveyor, to complete the Mason and Dixon Line 
that separated western Virginia and Pennsylvania.25 Soon after, he joined eminent 
astronomers Thomas Hutchins and David Rittenhouse to run the western boundary of 
Pennsylvania (and eastern limit to the space to be surveyed according to the Ordinance 
grid) and, in 1789, surveyed the western border of New York. 
By 1790, Ellicott had earned a reputation as one of America's preeminent men of 
science and its most capable surveyor. Benjamin Franklin noted that "I have long known 
Mr. Andrew Ellicott as a Man of Science [and am] acquainted with his Abilities in 
Geographical Operations of the most important kind, which were performed by him with 
For a thorough biography of Andrew Ellicott's life as a surveyor, see Silvio A. Bedini, "Andrew Ellicott, 
Surveyor of the Wilderness," in Plotters and Patterns of American Land Surveying, ed. Roy Minnick 
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the greatest Scientific Accuracy." It was this ability to achieve "Scientific Accuracy" 
under the difficult conditions of western surveys that prompted the federal government to 
entrust him with shaping the Republic and, in 1789, Ellicott was appointed Geographer of 
the United States.27 
His first (and most famous) task as national surveyor was to run the boundary 
lines of the 10 by 10 mile square that delineated the federal zone of the United States, 
Washington D.C. Although this internal survey was crucial to the geographical and 
political situation of the U.S. during the federal period, it has been thoroughly studied,28 
while his role in forming the external boundaries of the United States, a far more 
important project to the integrity of the U.S., has gone overlooked by historians. 
In October of 1790, the U.S. sent Ellicott to run a border between Georgia and 
Creek Country, a region that had never been bought by the British and was thus not 
officially ceded to the United States. The Scottish-Creek leader Alexander McGillivray 
had settled this border in a treaty earlier that year, but his authority among the Creeks was 
concurrently being undermined by one William Augustus Bowles, a white Creek who 
claimed he could supply men, artillery, and trade with the British Caribbean if the Creeks 
Andrew Ellicott: His Life and Letters, ed. Catharine Van Cortland Mathews (New York, The Grafton 
Press, 1908), 69. 
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rejected McGillivray's boundary. According to Bowles, McGillivray had sacrificed the 
Creeks national territory to enrich a small cadre of property-coveting Creek leaders, men 
who amassed large fortunes in cattle and slaves in the years after the Revolution. 
Bowles, who was quickly garnering popular support, promised to "prevent the lines being 
run" that were, he rightly claimed, merely the means by which the U.S. planned to steal 
the Creeks' land. "The Indians, distracted by his arts," chose not to sanction the agreed-
upon line until a new treaty could be resolved.31 
All the while, "a considerable body of troops of the United States, and Mr. 
Ellicott, the surveyor... waited for the Creek chiefs."32 Faced with the impending threat 
posed by Ellicott and his soldiers, Bowles tried to reify the Creeks' borders with the 
geographic technology favored by Indians since the 1750s: maps. In a letter signed 
"General Wm. A. Bowles, Director of Affairs, Creek Nation," he told Ellicott that the 
Creeks would not tolerate the violation of the map-based boundary they had settled with 
the British. 
Gazette of the United States, "Philadelphia. Intelligence of Fresh Disturbances among the Creek 
Indians," 7 December 1791. Like McGillivray, Bowles was a man who drifted across imperial and racial 
borders during an era when nation-states were increasingly focused on solidifying their boundaries. Born 
in Maryland to white parents, he rose to power among the Creeks, traveled to Britain after the Revolution 
to curry their support for that nation, and traveled throughout the Caribbean and the Floridas, where he was 
eventually arrested by the Spanish and died in jail. On the "cosmopolitan world" inhabited by men like 
McGillivray and Bowles, see Eliga Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds." 
30
 For details of the importance of property in late eighteenth century Creek society, see Claudio Saunt, A 
New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733-1816 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
3i
 Gazette of the United States, "Philadelphia. Intelligence of Fresh Disturbances among the Creek 




You well know that the cause of discontent with us has ever been the limits and 
borders of our country...the invisible line between us and the white people... We 
beg you to consider, whether on an inspection of the map of this country, and the 
history of the last two centuries, it does not appear that... it is the Indians, and not the 
white people, who have most reason to complain of streightened limits.33 
Bowles indignantly cites the U.S. plan for "disposing of certain vacant lands," space that 
was actually the Creeks' "whole country, which nature has bestowed upon us." Perhaps 
no one bothered to tell Bowles that Indians no longer had any natural rights in the eyes of 
U.S. officials, especially not to lands coveted by the Republic.34 He disingenuously 
asked why "we at this time see a military force brought within the borders of our country, 
who pretend to treat with us about a border."35 As a man with extensive experience in 
both imperial and Indian diplomacy, Bowles knew full well that Ellicott and his army 
were there to force an onsite boundary that would steal a large part of Creek Country and 
set the stage for further incursions. Nevertheless, and despite his boasts of access to 
troops and munitions, he could forward no more tenable defense against the incursion 
than citing the boundary mapped between the Creeks and Britain, a European power that 
no longer controlled the land in question. 
In the colonial era, the Indians would have been able to prevent or alter an 
unwanted official survey by harassing the surveyors or coercing them into drawing a 
more favorable line. The U.S. warrior-surveyors, however, made such resistance very 
dangerous. Although Bowles threatened that "it is our solemn determination to sell our 
lives for our country," the Creeks knew that waging a war against the U.S., or even 
33
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directly interfering with the survey, could cost them their property or their lives. They 
thus defended their land with maps and rights. It is not that Indians placed such emphasis 
on mapped boundaries because they lacked the knowledge or ability to conduct formal 
surveys; indeed, Indians had participated in almost every significant surveying project of 
the late colonial period. Boundary maps were the only recognized claim they could 
make, even if the original recognition was with Britain. The Creeks and other Indian 
groups preferred the weak claims they could make from maps to their utter lack of rights 
in the new Republic. 
It would take until January of 1793 to sort out the details, but the Creeks were 
ultimately unable to resist the pressure of the Geographer of the Unites States and his 
army, and the line was drawn where the U.S. wished. Racial violence and the threat 
thereof in the guise of formal surveying had entered the U.S. ethos of westward 
expansion, and Indians would be kept outside of the U.S.'s bordered lands by force. 
Unprotected by any recognized legal right, Indian lands were simply waiting to be 
enclosed within the limits of the United States, without, of course, the Indians 
themselves. 
While Indian lands could be treated as territory in which no rights were 
recognized except white conquest, the European colonies bounding the U.S. on three 
sides had to be considered real property in which the U.S. had no jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. approach to running onsite borders between itself and these 
recognized territories was quite similar to the ways in which they bullied Indian groups 
into accepting limits on the landscape. Militant surveys ensured precision boundaries on 
139 
the landscape, even when the officials of European-owned territories were against the 
survey. 
The 1795 Pinckey-Godoy Treaty between the U.S. and Spain agreed to a line 
between the Floridas and the U.S. along the 31st parallel, and George Washington wrote a 
commission for Maj. Ellicott and an army escort to run the boundary. Upon arriving in 
Natchez in February of 1797, however, Ellicott learned (by intercepting a secret 
document) that the Florida government was decidedly reluctant to run the agreed-upon 
line, hoping "that delay on their part would reduce [the Treaty] to a dead letter."37 
Officials in Florida tried to do more to impede the survey than simple delay. A 
border fort at Natchez that was supposed to be vacated was reinforced and attempts were 
made to arouse both local Creoles and local Indians against the survey party. "Spanish 
agents" told the Chickasaws and Choctaws "to oppose the demarcation of the boundary 
[because] immediately upon the establishment of the line, the United States would take 
possession of all the lands...and drive them off by force."38 Although Ellicott was 
indignant about such accusations, they would, of course, prove true, and warrior-
surveyors like himself would turn Chickasaw and Creek Country into the United States. 
In response to Spanish resistance, Ellicott asserted himself as an armed diplomat 
who wanted to draw his line in peace but was also more than willing to use his army to 
36
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ensure its appearance on the landscape. He was even ready to use his army to expand the 
bounds of his country. Ellicott noted in his field journal that "I consider it my duty, as a 
citizen of the United States, not only to retain the post then occupied, but to extend our 
limits if hostilities should commence," and then asked his commissary "to procure all the 
ammunition he could find."39 Despite Spain's recognized right to Florida, Ellicott treated 
that territory like extra-legal Indian Country that could be bounded where and how the 
U.S. chose. 
Borderland settlers also played a part in this tense drama, most of whom 
(according to Ellicott) feared Spanish reprisals but wanted to be recognized as U.S. 
citizens. Thus, on the southwestern frontier, Ellicott and his army allied with local 
settlers against Spain, much like officials and squatters had joined forced against the 
Indians in the Northwest in 1787. Since many of these settlers were recognized as 
Spanish citizens, the Florida government was furious that Ellicott would sanction this 
alliance. Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, governor of West Florida, wrote Ellicott that "I am 
informed that the officer commanding your escort, has enlisted several persons residents 
of this government, which being against the law of nations, it cannot pass unnoticed... the 
object of the escort not being to raise men in this country."41 Ellicott, though, disagreed 
with this law of nations-based thinking. As he noted in his journal, "the express purpose 
of making use of the inhabitants to carry the treaty into effect, or secure the country by 
force, if such a measure should become necessary, was our real motive." Ellicott 
39
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respected Spain's rights under the law of nations as little as he respected the Creek's 
rights by the law of nature, and was prepared to break either legal tradition to run his line. 
Three tense months after his arrival, Ellicott finally forced the Spanish to 
(re)commit to the latitudinal boundary line and, over the course of the next two years, 
that boundary was run from New Orleans to Georgia. Ellicott was indeed a skilled 
surveyor—he ran this boundary with the precision that he had earned him recognition as 
one of the foremost American scientists of his age. But it was the informal aspects of his 
surveys that made him successful, allowing him to run the U.S.'s external borders 
whether its neighbors liked it or not. Breaking the laws of nations and nature was not 
part of formal surveys during the colonial era; indeed, this blatant disregard for the 
accepted conventions of civilized society was among the many complaints that officials 
had hurled at western squatters. In the independence era, though, such illegalities merged 
into state-sanctioned border making, and the era of U.S. expansion officially began. 
Conclusion 
In the colonial era, there had been a geographic balance of power between Indians 
and white officials. The spatial conceptions and claims of each group were based on 
formal conventions that allowed the other to trump or manipulate most proposed 
boundaries. Indian-made maps that followed European standards had to be approved by 
officials in order to be legitimate while the onsite surveys that were the basis of official 
boundaries could be stopped or changed by Indians. From the Seven Years War until 
about 1770, white frontier settlers and their informal approach to land had been a menace 
to both Indians and officials alike because settler land claims were made legitimate by 
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virtue of onsite improvements and occupation, neither of which required the approval of 
Indians or officials. Although these groups tried to prevent settlers from violating 
formally mapped and surveyed boundaries, the settler approach proved too efficient to be 
denied. 
When officials co-opted the most effective aspects of the settler land ethic, the 
balance tipped fully in favor of officials, the group with the money and resources to 
exercise the full potential of this land ethic. By the 1790s formal surveying was 
supported by racial violence and onsite Indian resistance could no longer act as a 
counterweight to official land schemes. In the meanwhile, the U.S. bolstered its own 
capacity to deny the legitimacy of map-based Indian borders by divesting Native 
Americans of the fundamental rights based on natural law. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, settlers and their land greed had been incorporated into the United States, and 
official recognition and support encouraged them to push further west and kill more 
Indians. 
White dominance of all United States land was the result of many political, 
biological, and military factors, yet border-making itself should not be overlooked in this 
milieu. The U.S. solidified its right to delineate and survey America's "real" boundaries 
by incorporating settler methods of defining borders but rejecting those of Indians as 
illegitimate, even though they were based on formal European geography. Like 
American land itself, geographic sciences and their power to claim land were to be 
reserved for whites only. 
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